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people. 6 Into the 1960s, left-wing groups continued not to be much of a threat to Franco: it was observed by a socialist activist in 1962, even after long strikes, that ‘a frontal attack of left -wing forces is not really likely’. 7 Restrictions on anti- Francoist publications continued throughout Franco’s tenure, with relaxation of censorship being more purported than genuine. 8 Therefore, it can be seen that, due to methods of control which Franco held – censorship, the Civil Guard, Falangists, the army, and large portions of the Church – Franco was able to ensure that left-wing opposition did not remove him from power. Although Franco was able effectively to clamp down on those most opposed to him, his control and influence were threatened more by those closer to his own side, with policy decisions increasingly made with the Opus Dei faction in mind, with whose views Franco disagreed somewhat. It could be argued that these groups should have been able to overthrow Franco, although his support from the army, and his political concessions, prevented this. First, at the end of the Civil War in 1939, Franco’s power was threatened by Quiepo de Llano, although the latter lacked the necessary support to displace the former. 9 In the early years of Franco’s rule, Serrano Suner became very powerful in the government, and something of a controller of Franco, restraining him from expelling the critical Archbishop Segura of Seville, despite the latter having insulted Franco publicly; there is evidence from the British intelligence network that Suner plotted to replace Franco with himself, before being replaced. Arguably, Franco was both restricted and threatened by Suner, although the eventual dismissal of Suner shows that Franco ultimately was in control of his government and an arbiter between different factions. 10 However, those who had greater influence and control over the government did not threaten Franco’s position so explicitly: instead, especially from 1957, Franco lost some control to technocrats and the Opus Dei faction, but he became more secure in his position as Caudillo, uniting Falangist and technocratic factions: the right-wing technocrats had no wish to remove Franco. 11 Technocrats had greater influence over policy, forcing Franco finally to abandon autarky in 1959 as part of the Stabilization Plan; they put pressure on him to apply to join the European Common Market. 12 Moreover, although it is clear that Franco was forced by financial necessity to accept conventional economic practices against his will, and thus his control could be seen to have declined, the Stabilization Plan is better seen as an example of Franco making concessions to those with greater expertise in order to preserve his position as Caudillo and hence his overall control. Nor did Franco face a serious threat to his power from monarchists: Don Juan was in a position of supplication in the late 1940s and accepted that Juan Carlos would be educated in Spain, which in itself increased Franco’s control over him, under the threat of Franco’s choosing another royal successor. 13 Although the Spanish socialist activist and former diplomat Vicente Girbau- León, saw in 1962 Don Juan as a focal point for opposition from those who wished ‘to get rid of General Franco’, and he expected that Don Juan would become King, he emphasized the disunity of the monarchists – some supported Franco, and those who did not had varying ideas about how regime change should happen – which was a key reason why anti-Francoist ones did not succeed in removing
6 Casanova 2010: 113. 7 Girbau-León 1962: 336, 339. 8 Garcia-Alvarez 1975: 116. 9 Beevor 2006: 402. 10 Ibid.: 402; Preston 2020: 354-357. 11 Preston 2020: 414-415, 420-422; Girbau-León 1962: 340. 12 Judt 2010: 516; Girbau-León 1962: 338. 13 Preston 2020: 381-382.
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