Franco
Church at this stage, it is more significant that, in fact, the Concordat made Franco more secure in his overall control, demonstrated by his subsequently increasingly relaxed attitude and greater leisure. 21 Furthermore, it is clear that even when the Church as a whole had become significantly less aligned with the interests of Franco, a conservative portion of the clergy continued to create associations between Franco and the Catholic religion by conducting services on state television, again justifying Franco’s control. 22 However, there were cases in which parts of the Spanish Catholic Church provided active opposition to Franco – admittedly, ones which apparently did not significantly harm his position: they demonstrate the limits of his authority, although he imposed control in some cases. As early as 1937, before Franco had taken over Spain, such opposition existed, with the priest Gallegos Rocafull writing of the ‘high spiritual life’ and ‘moral elevation’ of Marxists, who were ostensibly a primary enemy of the National Front. 23 In addition to this, in 1940, the then Archbishop Bishop of Seville, previously Cardinal Segura, compared Caudillo s to ‘captains of thieves’ and the ‘devil’ by commenting on the etymology of the title adopted by Franco. Franco was not in a position to have Segura expelled, as this would have created a scandal, and so he was powerless to stop such high-profile and publicized opposition, which was ‘well - known’ into the 1970s. 24 Both examples of opposition indicate that the Church was by no means entirely supportive of Franco, and the latter shows that Franco’s control over speech was limited, even early on in his rule. Clerical opposition to the government continued to develop: from the 1950s, some priests were associated with workers’ associations which complained about living conditions, inequality and the violence of the authorities. 25 Later on in Franco’s rule, much o f the Church became very distanced from Franco’s regime: in 1971, a Joint Assembly of Priests and Bishops was held, influenced by the outcomes of the Second Vatican Council: all delegates were elected, and they voted in favour of ‘freedom of expression’ and association, and ‘free union meetings’, as well as to replace the 1953 Concordat and to de-couple Church and state; there was some consideration given by delegates to the prospect of an apology for the Church’s support of the Nationalists in the Civil Wa r. The distance between Church and state, and thus Franco’s lack of control of the Church, is also evident from the Franco- supporting press’s condemnation of the Assembly. 26 Opposition to Franco’s political control on the part of the Church continued to develop: the Commissions of Justice and Peace proposed an amnesty for political prisoners as part of the Pope’s choice of ‘reconciliation’ as the ‘motto of Catholic Holy Year’ in 1975: the Church was clearly leading opposition, with its petition receiving 130,000 signatures. It was described by Spanish academic and theologian Alfred Bardaji in 1976, when Spain’s government had changed little since Franco’s death, as ‘the most important institution from which . . . an act of opposition can be launched’. Althou gh it is true that clerical opposition demonstrates the limitations to Franco’s control of Spain, especially but not exclusively later in his rule, Franco still could impose some control: priests who delivered hostile sermons were fined significant sums and imprisoned in the case of non-payment. The authorities were helped in persecuting anti- Francoist priests by the violent group ‘Warriors of Christ the King’, which may have collaborated with the police. Furthermore, material improvements by the 1970s helped to replace Catholic associations
21 Judt 2010: 227-228; Preston 2020: 403. 22 Bardaji 1976: 204. 23 Gallegos Rocafull 2016: 38. 24 Paul Preston 1993: 352-353; Bardaji 1976: 202. 25 Thomas 2016: 39. 26 Thomas 2016: 39; Bardaji 1976: 200-201.
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