Franco
as a justification for Franco’s overall control. 27 Thus, it can be seen that Franco gained legitimacy, with which he kept control of Spain, from the Catholic Church for a long time; nevertheless, there was an increasing amount of widely-publicized opposition to Franco from the clergy, demonstrating that Franco lost control of this important institution to some extent. However, the declining importance of the Catholic Church in formulating public opinion, and Franco’s repr essive control, allowed him to remain Caudillo in the face of clerical threats to his control. Franco’s control of the ordinary Spanish people – excluding known political opponents and the clergy – had rather varied levels of success: earlier on in his rule, it seems that Franco exerted a large amount of control over the Spanish people, although, later in his tenure, the ordinary people became more politicize d and opposed to the system. Franco’s control over the people had clearly declined, although the concessions he made, combined with the use of repression where necessary, helped him to remain in overall control of Spain. One successful instance of controlling the Spanish people, however, was the 1947 referendum on the Law of Succession: due to the use of propaganda in favour of the Law, 82% of those eligible voted in favour, which can be seen as a success in promoting popular support for the regime. 28 Furthermore, there was a system of ‘vertical unions’ established by the Fuero del Trabajo (Labour Charter) which held employers and workers alike subject to Franco’s state. 29 In addition to this, the successful repression after the strikes of April 1962 demonstrates that, even in the face of popular opinion, Franco could use ‘brutal repression’; earlier on in his rule, he could simply restrict imports of American films at his leisure, with little need to consider what the Spanish people wanted. 30 Franco was able in October 1953 to give the Spanish people the impression that he was the greatest leader of the twentieth century after making Spanish cities nuclear targets by hosting American bases near them. 31 However, strong evidence for ‘a great wave of solidarity in support of the strikes’ in 1962 indicates that Franco was losing his grip on the politics of the ordinary people, and that the working class was becoming politically mobilize d: indeed, the strikes achieved something of a ‘victory for the workers’. Furthermore, around this time, it was perceived that the ‘middle classes’ were increasingly in favour of ‘political reform’. Therefore, some very limited liberal ization and accounting for popular opinion was required: ‘popular . . . opinion’ was a reason for attempts at achieving closer ties with Europe; student- only protests were tolerated; in 1968, religious freedom was granted, while public spending increased in the early 1970s in order effectively to buy popularity. 32 Additionally, perhaps the best indication that Franco ultimately failed to influence the politics of the Spanish people is that the first free elections after his death to the Constituent Assembly, in 1977, had very similar results to those of the 1936 election, when the Popular Front was elected; however, this being after Franco’s death, it can be seen that Franco managed to keep sufficient, if not completely unfettered, control of the people to maintain his position, by making them politically demobilized. 33
27 Ibid.: 203-211. 28 Garcia-Alvarez 1975: 115. 29 Vinas 2016: 143, 151-152. 30 Girbau-León 1962: 339; Judt 2010: 232. 31 Preston 2020: 400. 32 Girbau-León 1962: 338-340; Judt 2010: 517-518, 522. 33 Ibid.: 520; Vinas 2016: 144.
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