Franco
Another threat to Franco’s c ontrol of Spain was foreign pressure: the changing international climate, particularly in the 1940s, threatened his control of Spain and pushed him to make certain decisions; however, he managed to present himself to the outside world such that the outside threat facing his control of Spain in the late 1940s receded, and to use his relationship with the outside world as propaganda to secure his popularity, and thus to enhance control, at home. During the Second World War, Franco retained a large amount of control, although threats to it as a result of the intervention dilemma must be acknowledged. First, it is quite possible that Suner plotted with the Germans to overthrow Franco. 34 Secondly, Franco may have been influenced through the bribery of key figures in his government by the British, through Juan March. 35 One could argue that Franco’s control of Spain was thus severely threatened and undermined; however, replacing Franco with Suner to get the already-impoverished Spain to attempt to help Germany may not have been of high priority to Hitler; it is likely that even without the British bribery scheme, Franco would have come to the same decision (not to intervene), given that even when the war was going well for the Axis in 1940, neither he nor the German government thought that it was worthwhile for Spain to join the war; by 1943, key generals were concerned on strategic grounds about the dangers of association with the losing Axis. 36 Moreover, Franco kept control of Spain at this time by balancing the pro-Allied and pro-Axis elements of his government against each other in order to keep power. 37 With the Allies victorious, Franco faced the threat that he would be removed from power: at the San Francisco conference of the United Nations, clear hostility to Franco emerged as a result of Franco’s associations with the Axis, with Joseph Paul - Boncour, a French delegate, speaking of the ‘great dream’ of expunging Fascism, and thus alluding to having Franco removed from power. 38 Indeed, it seemed that his control was under threat, with it evidently being considered somewhat remarkable in December 1945 that he ‘still rules’. 39 A diplomatic blockade started, and there were some expectations that such a removal would occur. 40 His position was described by American academic Anna Lane Lingelbach in late 1945 as one which required ‘considerable tight - rope walking’. 41 However, as circus performers can walk a tight-rope, Franco managed skilfully to avoid being removed, by making limited concessions and presenting himself in a way that the West found acceptable, and thus he preserved his control. Although at home Nazi Germany was celebrated to its very end, he presented his regime such that it might appeal to foreign powers: in April 1945 the Spanish government stated (falsely) that American military planes were using Spain as a base; in early May, at the behest of the American ambassador, he refused to provide sanctuary to members of the Vichy regime and imprisoned them when they did not leave; by July, it was expected that Spain would manufacture blankets for the UN to distribute as aid; foreign press censorship was lifted. By the beginning of July, there were also American expectations (admittedly misplaced) that there would be a large amount of liberalization in what was to become the Fuero de los Espanoles , ostensibly a bill of rights. 42 Although these efforts were initially unsuccessful, indicated by the aforementioned diplomatic boycott, and the fact that the British Ambassador, Ivo Mallet, among
34 Preston 2020: 355, referring to Hoare’s communicating of intelligence to Eden. 35 Ibid.: 355, 358. 36 Ibid.: 349-350, 361. 37 Ibid.: 354. 38 Houston 1952: 684. 39 Lingelbach 1945b. 40 Garcia-Alvarez 1975: 115. 41 Lingelbach 1945b: 536. 42 Preston 220: 369; Lingelbach 1945a: 25-26; Vinas 2016: 147-148.
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