Idi Amin
acknowledged short-term instability for long-term gains, including nationalizing substantial wealth. This policy's success is evident in its long-term wealth redistribution impact. Today, the wealthiest men in Uganda are ethnically Ugandan – while over the border in neighbouring Kenya, another former British colony with a wealthy and influential Indian population, but one that maintained the status quo rather than conducting an expulsion, four of the five wealthiest Kenyans are ethnically Indian, with much of Kenya’s wealth flowing out of the country as a result . 9 One further allegation often made against the Ugandan regime is that its foreign policy reflected the despotic and unstable nature of its ruler. Amin’s relations with Israel have frequently been drawn on to make this point. Israel's interests in northeast Africa, especially in what is now South Sudan, fostered strong ties with the Obote government. 10 In 1972, Amin severed these ties, expelled Jews, shut synagogues, and closed bases aiding Israel's Sudan operations. He halted Ugandan army support for Israel there and outlawed black Jews, including the Abayudaya community. In the short term, consequences included losing a £10 million loan and advanced weaponry from Israel. In the longer term, it was the Israelis who inflicted the most serious and humiliating foreign policy reverse that the Amin regime ever endured, the humiliating 1976 liberation of some 250 hostages held at Entebbe Airport as a result of the hijacking of a plane that had departed Israel for France before being rerouted to Uganda. 11 Once again, however, it is possible to r einterpret Amin’s Israel policy, and indeed to see it as not only rational, but also far- sighted. To begin with, the status of Uganda’s relations with Israel was not entirely in Amin’s hands. Relations first deteriorated as a result of Israel’s refusal to recognize the new Ugandan regime after the overthrow of Obote, a decision that would have cast serious doubt over existing agreements – including military co-operation and the agreed loan – no matter what actions Amin might have taken. From Amin’s perspect ive, moreover, the alliance was an unequal one. Uganda was helping Israel in Sudan without obtaining Israeli help in stemming Tanzanian aggression on its southern border. This was a serious problem, since the Tanzanians had allied with the Langi and Acholi peoples of southern Uganda and began destabilizing the region by attacking military posts in early 1972. 12 Amin’s response offers the best evidence that his foreign policy can be seen as both rational and beneficial in the longer term. By turning to allia nces with Israel’s enemies, the Arab states, and buttressing those with attempts to Islamize Uganda itself, he put further distance between his regime and the old British colonial state, improving the internal cohesion of Ugandan society and creating fresh alliances with wealthy, petrol-producing Arab states at just the time that the 1973 oil shock – caused by Arab determination to raise prices to punish American support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War – was causing a worldwide economic meltdown. 13 Amin’s support for Islam allowed him to forge important new alliances. He built ties with the Libyan regime of Colonel Gaddafi, visited Mecca twice in 1972 alone, and met with other Arab leaders, including King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Tapping these new friendships, he was able to secure a $33 million loan, one which far exceeded the loss he made from the withdrawal of Israeli and American
9 Oluwole 2022. 10 Oded 2006: 6.
11 Kyemba 1977:167. 12 Leopold 2020: 214. 13 Oded 2006: 6.
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