Why had these reforms occurred? Constitutional liberties were introduced because the Russian liberal elite wished to modernise Russia in order to become more of a European nation (Figes, 2014: 33). The reforms, however, simply stoked further unrest and mutiny among peasants and soldiers. Moreover, Nicholas II was never wholly committed to the reforms or the limits on his sovereignty. The reforms were introduced simply to preserve his autocratic regime. He had not been converted to the principle of constitutional monarchy enshrined within Western democracies. Nevertheless, Solomon (2008 p.267) argues that ‘the story of courts in late Tsarist Russia is distinguished by the degree of independence achieved by judges despite the political system’. Judicial independence was almost totally reversed under the new Soviet regime, and especially under Stalin. Here, the law was subordinated to the exercise of autocratic political power. The Bolsheviks’ attitudes to the courts and lawyers were generally negative. The priority was to ensure that the law, the courts and the judiciary served the Communist state, as expressed in policy or in statements from party officials. Judicial appointments were rubber-stamped by party officials, with party members being preferred, and judges had only limited security of tenure. Their reappointment was also subject to political vetting. In any case, most lawyers had little expertise as they lacked even secondary education and were therefore relatively easy to control. The legal system and the courts became an instrument of the Communist state, and were used increasingly to legitimate Stalin’s autocratic rule. The mid-1930s, though, witnessed some changes. Judges experienced better training and education and were able to exercise more discretion. Courts had renewed jurisdiction (as under the Tsars) over criminal and civil disputes. The aim was to stabilise Soviet society and to reduce criminal behaviour in urban areas (Figes, 2014). However, judicial independence was very limited. Supreme Court Directives constrained judges in practice, and individuals were punished if they did not conform. Centralisation of power in the Supreme Court meant that the law functioned as an instrument of state rule and social control. Solomon (2008: 269) concludes that under Stalin ‘law meant nothing more than the laws and regulations promulgated by the state – there was no pretence that they might constrain the leader.’ Chillingly, the Supreme Court was even used to hear prosecutions for political crimes during Stalin’s purges of 1934-38. The verdicts of the court were never in doubt, but the use of the judiciary strengthened Stalin’s ability to purge his enemies (both real and imagined). For Bingham (2011: 67) the Stalinist approach to the law constituted a ‘legal tragedy’ symptomatic of a totalitarian political system. The law was identified with the will (or dictatorship) of the proletariat, therefore ‘whatever was prescribed by the state in the form of statutory law was lawful’. In contrast, under Nicholas II, the judiciary was to an extent independent from central government and was also able to dispense justice at the lower court level. Some Western legal principles were even beginning to be established prior to the turmoil of the 1917 revolution. The rule of law also requires freedom of expression. In authoritarian regimes freedom of expression is feared as it can lead to criticism, social unrest and an inability to control the population. Censorship of the press occurred under Tsar Nicholas II. It was illegal to discuss affairs of the state, to spread ideas that threatened the regime’s stability and for there to be public discussion of government policies and news reports that could excite social unrest. However, Imperial censorship was not rigorously enforced. Moreover, after the 1905 revolution, there were reforms to the censorship law as the public demanded a free press. The result was an increase in newspaper reporting of political events and the ability to criticise the regime. In contrast, censorship under Stalin was strictly enforced. The state controlled television and radio broadcasting, newspapers and book publishing. It was almost impossible for anyone to criticise or speak out against the state. What was also distinctive about Stalin (and different from imperial rule) was his attempt to control people’s private lives, including cultural forms of expression, such as photos, films and art. People who had fallen out of favour were removed from pictures or paintings. Censorship was a fearsome tool of repression. For some historians, like Figes (2014:144), the very aim of the revolution was to create a society in which people would police themselves through ‘mutual surveillance and the denunciation of “‘anti-Soviet’ behaviour”’. Typically totalitarian regimes (as opposed to authoritarian) try to control almost all aspects of social life including people’s private lives, thoughts and actions and Stalin’s rule is clearly consistent with this aim. An active secret police is required to suppress political and ideological opposition and is therefore an important tool of state control. The secret police under Nicholas II, the Okhrana, were formed in 1881 to combat political terrorism and to eradicate opposition groups. The Okhrana had the right to search, imprison and exile citizens without judicial scrutiny or consultation with the Public Prosecutor. There were many activities that required permission from the police, such as giving concerts and building bath houses. The Okhrana were an ever-present part of everyday life for Russians. They were allowed to make searches and seizures of private property and exercise supervision over all posters. According to Richard Pipes (1974) the secret police were omnipotent in Russian society at that time. Nevertheless, he maintains that imperial Russia was not a ‘full-blown
E S SAY S
The Mushett Cole Humanities Extended Essay Prize
THE TALE OF TWO AUTOCRAT S : WAS N I CHOLAS I I OR S TAL I N MORE AUTHOR I TAR I AN AND WHY ? ALEX WALSH ( YEAR 1 3 )
Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917) and Stalin (1922-1952) were two highly autocratic Russian rulers. Which of these rulers was the more repressive is not at all obvious, but there is reason to believe that authoritarian rule might be most pronounced under Tsar Nicholas II. His inability to reform Russia to the satisfaction of both peasants and workers led to one of the most profound revolutions in 20th century history, culminating in the development of a fully-fledged Communist state. Communism was intended to be quite different from the Tsar’s autocratic rule. Marx, writing in the Communist Manifesto, speculated that such a society would be a ‘world… for the common people’ and that ‘the sounds of happiness’ would ‘reach the deepest springs’. Communism under Stalin, and its associated terror and purges, was far from utopian, however. Possessed of a paranoid and insecure personality, Stalin was intent on the destruction of both political opponents and members of the Communist Party itself (Montefiore, 2014; Service, 2009). It could be that both rulers, although they operated from different political ideologies, were as ‘bad as each other’. This essay will evaluate this question by comparing the stance of these two rulers towards three pillars of the authoritarian state, namely the judiciary, political censorship and the secret police. In his analysis of the Rule of Law, Lord Bingham (2011) argues that a ‘truly independent judiciary is one of the strongest safeguards against executive lawlessness’ (p.25). Judges, in order to be independent and to be able to enforce the law against the state, must be free from corruption by state officials and be protected from intimidation and victimisation. All too often, though, the judiciary becomes a ‘victim of authoritarian governments’. Despite the autocratic system of imperial rule, however, the legal system under the Tsars had undergone substantial reform, especially under Alexander II (1855-1881). The Judicial Reforms of 1864 introduced a ‘revolutionary change’ in legal processes (Pipes, 1974; Solomon, 2008). The outcome was a system of independent courts that coexisted uneasily with Tsarist autocratic rule. Judges were given security of tenure, as well as better training and pay, and were able to apply the law using their own discretion. Trials were opened up to the public and individuals were represented by legal counsel. The Tsars tried to minimise the effects of these reforms. Over time political offences were removed to the sphere of military courts and not dealt with in the normal court system, and steps were taken to limit judicial decision making. Alexander III (Nicholas’s predecessor) tried to reassert Tsarist control and reversed most of Alexander II’s liberal reforms. In 1885 a decree was passed which allowed the Minister of Justice to exert greater control over the judiciary and hold closed court sessions. Magistrates’ duties were shifted to town judges appointed directly by the Tsar. Nevertheless, for the first time in Russia, the principle of judicial independence had been introduced. Nicholas II even extended reform of the Russian legal system. However, the reforms did not reflect his conversion to the ‘rule of law’ but to the need to preserve imperial autocracy in the face of rising political opposition and civil unrest. In these circumstances the Tsar issued an Imperial manifesto on 12 December 1904 that strengthened the rule of law and eased restrictions on the press. Perhaps the most important reforms occurred in 1905. Against a backdrop of civil unrest, a general strike, and an increasingly unpredictable military, it was feared Nicholas might lose his throne. Eventually Nicholas was pressured to sign a Manifesto on October 17th 1905 that introduced civil liberties, freedom of speech and assembly, cabinet government and a legislative assembly (Duma) (Figes, 2014). Many of his reforms were introduced, although they failed to end the unrest.
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