OVERVIEW
In today’s world, many people rely on social media for news, but this has also made it easier for false and misleading information—called disinformation— to spread. Disinformation is intentionally created to deceive people, and it can cause division and confusion on important social, political, and health issues. It’s become such a serious problem that experts now see it as a cybersecurity threat. This research introduces a new tool called the Disinformation Intentionality and Impact (DII) Typology, which helps us understand and categorize disinformation based on how believable it is and how much harm it can cause. The more believable the false information is, the more likely people are to share it, even if they don’t realize it’s
TULLOCK CONTEST ALLIANCES WITH PROPORTIONAL PRIZE-SHARING AGREEMENTS: PRIVATE COLLECTIVE ACTION MECHANISMS? Coles Research Symposium on Homeland Security Special Issue, SIFALL24-02, November 2024
false. The typology uses principles from information manipulation theory and risk management to evaluate how likely disinformation is to go viral and how deeply it might divide people. The DII typology helps identify different types of dis-information and suggests targeted ways to reduce the harm they can cause. To show how it works, the typology is applied to real examples, including political events. The paper also offers recommendations for how organizations and platforms can reduce the spread of harmful disinformation online.
James Boudreau Shane Sanders
OVERVIEW
TAKEAWAYS
This paper focuses on humanity’s supposedly irrational behavior in conflict decision-making, challenging two rationalist puzzles in political science and economics: war’s in-efficiency and alliance formation. More specifically, we ask whether alliances can benefit the allies. Standard Tullock contest alliances are plagued by free riding, undermining successful collective action. In a three-party contest environment when two of the parties ally, input substitution and fixed prize division hinder collective action. Analyzing the same con-test with input-cost complementarity and proportional prize division, we propose a trans-formative solution that avoids the usual problems of alliance formation and stability. While input-cost complementarity partially mitigates those concerns, a proportional prize-sharing agreement offers a comprehensive remedy, ensuring equitable contributions and gains for the allied parties. The proposed approach not only resolves the alliance- formation puzzle but also enhances the allies’ prospects for success.
Standard contest models can’t explain alliance formation, as alliances make both allies worse off. Cost complementarities alone do not resolve the collective action problem. Proportional prize-sharing aligns the allies’ incentives, resolving the alliance puzzle. NATO’s historical experience supports the role of proportional rewards in alliance behavior. A 2% pledge of military spending will be ineffective if alliance benefits are not shared proportionally.
TAKEAWAYS
Introduction of the Disinformation Intentionality and Impact Typology for Risk Management. Classifies disinformation threats based on intentionality of the spread and the impact. Identifies four distinct categories of false information spreaders based on DII categories. Proposes a model outlining risk mitigation strategies based on the DII typology. Proposes a New Organizational Role for risk assessment: Disinformation Management Officer.
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