they occur. These parties include the DOE, the utilities, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Transportation, and the states” (emphasis in original) (NWTRB 1990b, p. 21). In its third report to Congress, the Board recognized that OCRWM had begun to incorporate human factors considerations into transportation planning and had directed its contractors to acquire human factors personnel. The Board noted again in its fifth report to Congress that OCRWM had made progress incorporating human factors considerations into the cask development and transportation system design. At this point the Board recommended that OCRWM develop supporting documentation for a human factors program, including a human factors program requirements document and a human factors design requirements document (NWTRB 1992a, p. xv). The NWTRB’s sixth report to Congress found that OCRWM had continued to make progress incorporating human factors into the transportation program, and human factors engineering requirements were being documented and placed in the technical baseline. In its 1994 Findings and Recommendations, the Board was encouraged that OCRWM had incorporated human factors and system safety principles into the request for proposals for the multipurpose canister procurement (NWTRB 1995, p.9). There was no further mention of human factors in subsequent NWTRB reports or OCRWM documents. While the NWTRB was impressed with OCRWM’s efforts early on to address the Board’s recommendations on system safety, little has been done to address the issue in recent years. In OCRWM’s “National Transportation Plan,” issued January 2009, there is no mention of human factors. The successor to OCRWM should develop a comprehensive approach to addressing human factors in managing transportation risk. SYSTEM SAFETY From its inception, the NWTRB repeatedly urged OCRWM to consider the effects of all decisions on the safety of the system as a whole. Transportation was included in the recommendation. In early reports, the Board encouraged OCRWM to establish a system safety program, staffed by dedicated personnel, to improve the safety of its repository program. In subsequent reports, the Board indicated that OCRWM had been receptive to this recommendation. In recent years there has been little mention of the topic from either party. Like the issue of human factors, system safety was identified early on by the NWTRB as an issue of concern relating to the transportation of spent fuel. According to the Board, a system safety program is “one that provides a life-cycle application of safety engineering and management techniques to the design of system hardware, software, and operations…staffed by professional system safety engineers whose duties are dedicated to safety” (NWTRB 1990a, p. 23). The Board expressed concern that OCRWM neither had such a program, nor personnel dedicated solely to providing system safety management and engineering. According to the Board, a system safety program for repository
High-Level/Cross- Cutting Issues HUMAN FACTORS Since its inception, the NWTRB has encouraged OCRWM to pay more attention to human factors and their contribution to the risk of the repository system, including transportation. The Board has noted that the majority of accidents in hazardous materials transportation are attributable to human error. The Board recommended that OCRWM establish a human factors program, staffed by trained professionals, to address human factors in the design of the national transportation program. Initially, the Board was impressed by OCRWM’s efforts to incorporate human factors considerations into its program. In recent years, there was little mention of the topic from either party. In its first report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy, the NWTRB identified system safety, human factors, and risk assessment and management as the three issues of concern relating to the transportation of spent fuel. According to the Board, “a human factors program provides a life-cycle application of what is known about human psychological, physiological, and physical limitations in the design and operation of systems to optimize system safety and operability” (NWTRB 1990a, p.23). Such a program would be staffed by human factors scientists and engineers and would address design issues such as human error. Human factors programs are recognized as contributing substantially to nuclear safety. The NWTRB observed that OCRWM did not have a human factors program, and thus there were no human factors professionals working on the transportation system. Because the majority of hazardous materials transportation accidents are caused by human error, the Board recommended that DOE establish a human factors program for transportation activities as well as other repository activities. In its second report to Congress, the NWTRB again encouraged OCRWM to include systems safety and human factors engineering programs to help ensure the safety of transport operations. The Board recognized that spent fuel shipments have historically had a very good safety record. However, the Board pointed out that shipments to a federal repository will occur in greater volume than any previous shipping campaign, which will result in more people being aware of and affected by high-level waste and spent fuel shipments. In addition, new facilities and technologies will be utilized in the federal repository program, and these changes may present new opportunities for accidents. According to the Board, “The opportunity exists now for all parties involved in the high-level nuclear waste management system to address these changes and their effects before, rather than after,
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