It took decades for the WIPP site to be consented to, developed, and put into operation. There were legal challenges, negotiations, and diverse interests, but in the end, it succeeded because it was a consent-based process from the beginning. As the BRC put it, “Ultimately, local support combined with other confidence- building measures proved sufficient to allay state concerns and allow the project to go forward” (BRC 2012, p. 49). Domestic experience was not the only evidence considered by the BRC. International experiences were also taken into account. Several countries’ processes were examined but the approaches of Finland, Sweden, and Canada particularly stood out. In Finland, the siting process took three transparent steps. First, there was a nationwide search for possible locations for two years in the early 1980s. Then, suitable sites went through preliminary investigations for six years. Finally, full scale environmental impact studies were undertaken for four sites from 1993 to 2000. The island of Olkiluoto was found to be a suitable host, had strong local support, already had two existing reactors, and had much of the country’s SNF onsite. The company responsible for Finland’s SNF applied for a decision-in-principle to begin work on the site. The municipal council approved the site 20 votes to 7, and the Finnish Parliament approved the site 159 to 3. The final license application was granted in 2015 and as of 2020, and “final disposal is scheduled to start in the 2020s and according to current plans, the repository would be sealed up by the 2120s” (Shrestha 2019). Sweden’s siting process has not been as straightforward as Finland’s. SKB, the company tasked with managing the Scandinavian country’s waste, first started investigating areas in 1977. These initial investigations were concluded in 1985 due to local opposition to test-drillings and the fact that the proposed disposal method could technically take place anywhere in the country’s crystalline bedrock. In 1992, SKB relaunched their siting efforts by sending letters to every municipality asking them to voluntarily apply to host the repository. Two municipalities came forward and agreed to feasibility studies but referendums in both locations shut down further momentum. For SKB, the third time was the charm. In 2001, the company approached three communities that already had nuclear facilities. Of these three, Östhammer and Oskarshamm agreed to further discussions. “Of the two remaining options, Forsmark [Östhammer] —which already hosts a large nuclear power plant and an operating repository for short-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste —was ultimately selected in 2009 because it offered better geology” (BRC 2012, p. 50). As of 2020, SKB has final approval from Sweden’s radiation safety authority but the Land and Environmental court has delayed its decision until later. While there are several lessons to be learned from the Finnish and Swedish experiences, Canada offers perhaps the best case study for the United States because it, too, has a level of government between localities and the nation; provinces in Canada and states in the United States. After a failed siting effort based solely on technical qualifications, Canada formed the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) to undertake a CBS approach.
The NWMO adopted an “Adaptive Phased Management” approach that learned from Canada’s past mistakes, Finland and Sweden’s successes, and strived to develop deep connections with Canadian communities, especially Aboriginal groups. The Adaptive Phased Management approach has been so successful that, in September 2012, NWMO announced a suspension of additional expressions of interest” (Metlay 2013, p. 31-2). As of 2020, the NWMO had narrowed its site selection to two areas: the Township of Ignace in northwestern Ontario and the Municipality of South Bruce in southern Ontario. As for the United States, there seemed to be progress on developing a CBS process following the final BRC report in 2012. In 2017, DOE released the “Draft Consent-Based Siting Process for Consolidated Storage and Disposal Facilities for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste.”The report reflects “DOE’s judgment — grounded in conclusions reached by previous studies and real-world experience with siting controversial facilities in the United States and elsewhere — that a consent-based process is more likely to deliver successful outcomes” (DOE 2017b, p. 2). The draft report even listed a five-phase, 17-step siting process and a rough schedule the proposed CBS process would follow: • Phase I: Initiate Consent-Based Siting Process and Invite Communities to Learn More; • Phase II: Site Assessment; • Phase III: Detailed Assessment; • Phase IV: Agreement; and • Phase V: License, Construct, Operate, and Close (ibid., p. 9-12). However, as in the past, political considerations precluded further development of this draft report and proposed CBS process. In 2017, the Trump Administration indicated interest in continuing the process to license Yucca Mountain as the permanent repository for the nation’s SNF. Over three years later, as of August 2020, DOE-NE’s website dedicated to the topic of CBS only said, “Thank you for your interest in this topic. We are currently updating our website to reflect the Department’s priorities under the leadership of President Trump and Secretary Perry” (DOE-NE 2020a) — a reference to the former Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, who left office in 2019. Finally, the President’s Financial Year 2021 (FY21) budget request for DOE makes some reference to a CBS process. “The Budget supports the implementation of a robust interim storage program and R&D on alternative technologies for the storage, transportation, and disposal of the Nation’s nuclear waste, with a focus on systems deployable where there is a willingness to host” (OMB 2020, p. 46). Of course, CBS is much more involved than finding a location with “a willingness to host,” but this could be an indication of political consensus of the need for CBS. If, or when, an administration and DOE begin seriously considering SNF and HLW interim storage sites, or a non-Yucca Mountain permanent repository, CBS must be a guiding principle. The same goes for private industry as they step into the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.
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