disposal-related research and development work,”with a focus on “evaluating geologic media for their impacts on waste isolation; evaluating thermal management options for various geologic media;… and developing a research and development plan for deep borehole disposal, consistent with BRC recommendations” (DOE 2013, p. 13). In 2012, DOE published a roadmap for a research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) project for DBD. “This DBD RD&D Roadmap is a plan for RD&D activities that will help resolve key uncertainties about DBD and allow for a comprehensive evaluation of the potential for licensing and deploying DBD for SNF and HLW” (Arnold et al. 2012, p. iv). One of the four major RD&D tasks listed by the roadmap was locating a site for the demonstration borehole that represented the geology and other characteristics that a possible future DBD would encounter. Shortly thereafter, DOE launched the DBFT, an RD&D project started at the end of FY 2014 and originally planned to last five years. The DBFT project was undertaken by a consortium under the leadership of Sandia National Laboratories. It sought to demonstrate drilling technology; evaluate downhole scientific analyses; evaluate test package and seals materials; develop and test engineering methods for test package loading, shielded surface operations, and test package emplacement and retrieval; develop and test sealing designs and emplacement methods; and demonstrate pre-closure and post-closure safety (Freeze et al. 2016, p. 4). To do this, two boreholes would need to be drilled: a characterization borehole about 8.5 inches in diameter for host rock and groundwater testing, and a field test borehole about 17 inches in diameter for engineering activities proof-of-concept. There would be no actual radioactive waste used in the DBFT. When siting the DBFT, eight factors were considered, among them distance to the crystalline basement rock level (less than 2 m), no evidence of fresh groundwater recharge at depth, low seismic/ tectonic activity, and a lack of existing/previous radioactive or chemical contamination within 10 km (ibid., pp. 9-11). With these factors in mind, DOE announced its DBFT site selection on January 5, 2016: “The U.S. Department of Energy has selected a Battelle Memorial Institute-led team to drill a test borehole of over 16,000 feet into a crystalline basement rock formation near Rugby, North Dakota” (DOE 2016). Located in north-central North Dakota, the 20-acre site was owned by the state. A public meeting held about a month later revealed a high level of concern that, despite government assurances to the contrary, the DBFT could lead to the eventual placement of nuclear waste in the area. The local government took action shortly thereafter, with the Pierce County Commission shutting down“any opportunity to drill an exploratory borehole near Rugby that would allow researchers to probe any potential for nuclear waste disposal” (Donovan 2016). This unanimous decision by the county commission left Battelle and the University of North Dakota’s Energy and Environmental Research Center with a $35 million federal project and no site to drill. During a meeting of DOE-NE’s Transportation Core Group that March, various stakeholders noted that the DBFT project was
handled very differently than the CBS process that DOE had launched at roughly the same time. These stakeholders pointed out that historical distrust of DOE, media framing, and the lack of an up-front guarantee that HLW and SNF would not be disposed of in North Dakota led to the project’s demise. In response, DOE- NE representatives said that the department had “no intention of forcing this as a repository on an unwilling community. DOE acknowledges that they should have approached the borehole testing in North Dakota differently” (DOE-NE 2016, p. 1). Despite what was said at that Transportation Core Group meeting, Battelle and DOE regrouped and set their sights to the south. In April they announced they were considering whether to locate the DBFT on private land in Spink County, South Dakota. As reported in Science magazine, Battelle “promised to engage locals earlier, and not repeat the same mistakes, such as when local officials first learned of the project from local newspaper articles” (Voosen 2016). DOE and the Battelle team hoped to avoid what happened in North Dakota by having two or three public meetings to answer community questions (MRMTC 2016a). Regardless of the public meetings, announcing the consideration of Spink County as the DBFT host without first consulting with the state and local governments was not consistent with a CBS process. Somewhat predictably and just like in North Dakota, mass public opposition and fears that the project would lead to future emplacement or aquifer pollution resulted in the Board of Spink
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