Industry Interest
procure casks and related equipment, and the time necessary to procure AAR S-2043-compliant railcars. DOE-NE also varied its time estimates based on scenarios where five casks versus 10 casks were available for shipments (ibid.). DOE-NE’s site analysis provides comprehensive and well- researched data and information that will remain useful throughout long-term transportation planning efforts. The well-documented reports that result from these site visits provide critical information for shipment planning, regardless of the final destination that is selected for storage and/or disposal of SNF. This evaluation of near-site infrastructure at commercial nuclear reactor sites further represents the best in partnership between DOE, states, and Tribes. State participation in the site visits provided valuable expertise with regard to local infrastructure, conditions, and rules and regulations. This effort has also kept open the lines of communication between the states, Tribes, utility personnel, and the DOE-NE personnel who will be developing the transportation system. The initial plan for the visits did not include states and Tribes as participants; however, at the urging of state and tribal members of the Transportation Core Group during its March 2013 meeting, DOE-NE agreed to invite representatives of the states, Tribes, and SRGs on the site visits (DOE-NE 2013b). Conversations related to DOE’s site analysis have also highlighted potential areas of conflict that will need to be addressed in SNF shipment planning. While some of the regions favor looking at barge as a potential shipping mode, the Midwestern states requested that barge capabilities not be considered for the sites located on the Great Lakes (DOE-NE 2013b). The region has long articulated its opposition to barge shipments of SNF travelling on the Great Lakes. DOE-NE decided to include evaluation of barge infrastructure for the sites in the Midwest in the interest of having comprehensive information. The site visits have provided invaluable information regarding the condition of the transportation infrastructure adjacent to the nuclear power plants. One of the key questions arising out of these visits is who will pay for infrastructure upgrades necessary prior to conducting shipments? There is little incentive for the utilities, state and local governments, or the railroads to do so, but DOE-NE also does not have funds specifically for this purpose. Additional federal funding will likely be needed to pay for the necessary infrastructure upgrades prior to the commencement of shipments. While the future of DOE’s SNF and HLW transportation program remain uncertain, DOE’s work to evaluate nuclear power plant site capabilities will have lasting value for documenting the current state of the sites and adjacent transportation infrastructure. The site visit report also provides a replicable process to follow if information needs to be gathered again in the future due to ongoing delays. Tribal, FRA, state, and SRG participation in these site visits has provided unique perspectives and observations that has added value to the effort.
With the federal government having failed to produce a storage solution, the nuclear energy industry has developed a keen interest in providing its own solutions. Companies have bought decommissioned or decommissioning nuclear power plants, thereby inheriting valuable decommissioning funds, and conducted decommissioning in a manner faster and cheaper than the utilities could. Other companies are seeking NRC licenses for CISFs that customers (including DOE, if authorized to do so) could use to store SNF until a permanent repository is available. These activities are of interest to the states because of their implications for transportation. While shipments conducted by the private sector would be subject to NRC and DOT regulation, Section 180(c) of the NWPA would not apply. The Midwestern states and its tribal partners are working together to better understand the impact that shipments of SNF to private facilities could have on the region. The nuclear energy industry effectively faces three concurrent crises regarding the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. First, there is the political standstill that has, for the most part, kept SNF stranded at the nuclear power plants and national defense sites at which it was created. Failures by the federal government to follow through on the 1982 NWPA, the 1987 NWPAA, and the 2012 BRC recommendations, combined with disputes with several state governments, has led to a lack of a permanent, or even temporary, destination for utilities to send their SNF. Second, this political standstill has led to the ever-increasing inventory of SNF in spent fuel pools and dry cask storage installations at nuclear power plants across the country. As of December 31, 2019, and according to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), there were 83,978 metric tons of used uranium stored in the U.S. with no destination (NEI 2020). Of that total, 21,760 metric tons —or about one-fourth—were being stored in the Midwest. As this SNF accumulates, facilities are running out of room to store the waste. In fact, Minnesota’s Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant alone has had to seek state permission to expand its SNF storage capacity in 1994, 2003, and 2009. The initial 1994 legislation allowed Northern States Power, now Xcel Energy, to reduce SNF crowding in its storage pool by building an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) holding up to 17 casks. The 2003 legislation increased this to 29 casks and a 2019 order by the Public Utilities Commission granted permission for the Prairie Island ISFSI to hold 35 additional casks (Minnesota Legislative Reference Library 2020). At the end of June 2020, there were 47 casks storing SNF at the Prairie Island ISFSI (Minnesota Department of Health 2020, p. 1). Finally, the cost of indefinitely storing this SNF and HLW is enormous, for both the electric utilities and U.S. taxpayers. Nuclear utilities and their ratepayers have been paying into the federal Nuclear Waste Fund since 1983. In FY19, the fund’s balance stood at nearly $41 billion (DOE 2019). Various budget constraints have
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