constricted view of what is required to restore trustworthiness; it has not implemented any consistent approach to doing so; and has rarely considered explicitly the consequences of its actions for public trust and confidence” (ibid., p. vi). Among its recommendations, the Task Force advised OCRWM to “commit itself to…early and continuous involvement of State and/or local advisory groups as well as national advisory bodies” (ibid., vii). Furthermore, the involvement envisioned by the Task Force “would be characterized by frequent contact, complete candor, rapid and full response to questions, use of at least some suggestions, and assistance in increasing the technical and oversight skills of the community” (ibid.). The Task Force also recommended that OCRWM undertake “[c]onsistent and respectful efforts to reach out to state and community leaders and to the general public for the purpose of informing, consulting, and collaborating with them about the technical and operational aspects of Departmental activities” (ibid.). To read OCRWM’s program documents and public information materials, however, one would conclude that states and other stakeholders were intimately involved in working with the program to develop the transportation system. One of the program’s last factsheets, prepared in 2008, specifically addressed“Stakeholder Interaction” and included the statement that “DOE is working with stakeholders through a collaborative planning process” (DOE 2008h, p. 1). This statement echoed earlier OCRWM documents, such as the 2003 Strategic Plan for the Safe Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste to YuccaMountain: A Guide to Stakeholder Interactions (DOE 2003). In the plan, OCRWM stated that its mission was to“manage and dispose of SNF and HLW in a manner that protects public health, safety, and the environment; enhances national and energy security; and merits public confidence” (DOE 2003, p. 1). The program pledged to“work with interested parties in a collaborative process to build a transportation system that supports the OCRWMmission and effectively addresses the concerns of stakeholders” (ibid., p. 2). Toward that end, OCRWM committed to“conduct a thorough, open and collaborative planning process with interested parties” (ibid.). For interactions with state and tribal governments, OCRWM declared, the “[s]tate regional groups will anchor our collaborative process with the states” (ibid., p. 4). In the Strategic Plan , OCRWMmay have said the right things, but its actions told another story. In their comments on the 2009 draft of OCRWM’s “National Transportation Plan,” the state regional groups observed that "DOE appears to understand ‘consultation and cooperation’ to consist largely of a review-and-comment function involving the states…and other stakeholders. This limited view is not consistent with the states’ vision of what consultation and cooperation mean” (Niles et al. 2009, p. 1). The regions urged OCRWM to“look to the 1986 Transportation Institutional Plan as a guide for managing [the] institutional program” (ibid.). TheWestern Interstate Energy Board’s (WIEB) JimWilliams examined the possible root causes of the disconnect between how OCRWM and the regions — the “anchors”of OCRWM’s “collaborative process” —defined“consultation and cooperation.”Acknowledging that OCRWM had“provided commendable statements regarding the role of consultation process in SNF system design,”Williams nevertheless
found that “DOE’s commitment to federal-state consultation remains tentative” (Williams 2009a, p. 1). Williams attributed some of the states’ concern over federal-state consultation to“recent DOE initiatives to preempt state authority in this critical aspect of SNF and HLWmanagement”— a reference to legislation OCRWM supported in 2006 and 2007 (see the section on State Regulation ). Williams asked, “Why does the consultation gap— the gap between expressed intent and actual process —persist?” (ibid., p.2). In answering the question, he identified eight “challenges” that were “primarily institutional,”one “rooted in human cognition,” and two involving“technical system design and application” (ibid., p. 7). One of the institutional challenges was a “receding sense of urgency,”with the opening date for the repository receding (at the time) far into the future. Williams urged OCRWM not to forget “a key lesson of history”— namely, the events that transpired during the nearly decade-long hiatus in DOE’s WIPP program while the department waited for “regulatory approvals and land withdrawal legislation” (ibid., p. 3). As Williams observed, “[d]uring this period, DOE authorized several rather remarkable people in its Transportation Management Division to negotiate intensively and continuously with the western states….The result was the creation of an ‘institutional infrastructure’ for such shipments, codified as the ‘WIPP Transportation Program Implementation Guide’” (ibid.). TheWIPP transportation program stands today as DOE’s most successful large-scale shipping program, and is cited often by the states in theWest and elsewhere as a model for how other DOE shipping programs — including OCRWM’s — should work cooperatively with states to plan shipments (Niles et al., 1998, p. 2; WGA 2009b). TheWestern states include “theWIPP model and effective coordination with states and tribes” in theWIEB“Report Card”on the OCRWM transportation program, with the program most recently scoring an“F” for giving“no sign that it intends to model key elements of its OCRWM transportation planning process after theWIPP program”— this “despite receiving clear policy direction on this issue not only fromwestern states, but from all four regional cooperative agreement groups” (emphasis in original) (WIEB, p. 2). Anne Clark and Tammy Ottmer, writing on the “model framework”established for WIPP shipments by DOE and theWestern Governors’ Association (WGA) transportation committee, concluded that “the success of the entire program has relied heavily upon the commitment of all parties to the concepts of open communication, collaboration, and cooperation” (Clark and Ottmer 2007, p. 7). Summing up OCRWM’s progress over the years, it is reasonable to describe the program as having fallen short of not only the expectations of the states and regions — key stakeholders — but also the high standard it set for itself in 1986. This is particularly unfortunate given 1) the clear direction the program received from DOE’s Secretary of Energy Advisory Board and 2) the excellent example set by the WIPP program managed by DOE’s Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO). It is hoped that, for future activities, the new or revamped program will look to the past, heed the recommendations it received, and engage in a truly cooperative and consultative process. To do so is the only way the transportation program will meet with success.
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