When the Obama Administration put an end to the transportation activities that supported the Yucca Mountain program, OCRWM had produced numerous documents that addressed, in whole or in part, the topic of route identification. None of these documents, however, presented a map of proposed routes that the programmight use for shipments to the repository. In the early years, before Yucca Mountain was officially designated for development as a repository, OCRWM attributed its reluctance to identify proposed routes to the lack of a final decision on the destination. In other words, the program did not wish to appear to prejudge the outcome of the site characterization process that was ongoing to determine whether Yucca Mountain was, indeed, suitable for development. Once that decision was finalized in 2002, however, OCRWM made little progress in the way of identifying routes. What progress it did make was the result of repeated prodding by stakeholders such as the regional groups. The Midwestern Radioactive Materials Transportation Committee, for example, identified route selection as a “key issue” in 2004: “The Midwestern states recommend that OCRWM identify, as soon as possible, the shipping routes in order for the Midwestern states to assess their training and financial assistance needs” (MRMTC 2004, p. 2). The NAS, in Going the Distance , weighed in on the subject of route selection after finding that OCRWM had neither “made public a specific plan for selecting rail and highway routes” nor “determined the role of its program management contractors in selecting routes or specific plans for collaborating with affected states, tribes, and other parties” (NAS 2006, p. 18). The NAS recommended that OCRWM“identify and make public its suite of preferred highway and rail routes for transporting spent fuel and high-level waste to a federal repository as soon as practicable to support state, tribal, and local planning, especially for emergency responder preparedness” (ibid.). The NAS further recommended that OCRWM involve states and tribes in route selection for the purpose of “obtain[ing] access to their familiarity with accident rates, traffic and road conditions, and emergency responder preparedness within their jurisdictions” (ibid.). The NAS noted that involving states and tribes “may improve the public acceptability” of the routes selected, thereby reducing the likelihood of route-related conflicts and associated “program delays” (ibid.). To be fair, OCRWM did include maps of “representative truck and rail routes” in its final environmental impact statement on Yucca Mountain, as well as maps for each of the states (DOE 2002, pp. J-24-25, J-133+). In the same document, however, the program acknowledged that, “[at] this time, about 10 years before shipments could begin, DOE has not determined the specific routes it would use to ship spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the proposed repository” (ibid., p. J-23). Instead, OCRWM planned “to identify the preliminary routes that DOE anticipates using in state and tribal jurisdictions” for the purposes of implementing Section 180(c) (ibid.). The final environmental impact statement did not address the process OCRWM would follow to select routes, nor the type (if any) of institutional interactions that would take place as part of the route selection process.
19). In explaining its recommendation, the NAS stated that, while dedicated train service did not appear to provide a radiological risk advantage over regular freight service, there were significant programmatic advantages in the areas of planning, operations, safety, security, and communications that made dedicated train service preferable. In addition, the public had shown a preference for dedicated train service for shipping spent fuel and high-level waste. The NAS believed that these advantages made it desirable for OCRWM to ship via dedicated train service. Since OCRWM issued its 2005 policy statement, this issue has been considered closed, to a large degree. However, the cancellation of the Yucca Mountain program creates new uncertainty regarding whether spent fuel and high-level waste might be shipped via general freight train to interim facilities. ROUTE IDENTIFICATION OCRWM’s Transportation Institutional Plan observed that, for the Yucca Mountain program, the “transportation of waste to facilities developed under the NWPA may be the most visible [program] element nationwide” (DOE 1986c, p. i). What makes the transportation element so visible, of course, is the presence of shipments traveling on highways and railways throughout the country. For this reason, route identification is perhaps one of the most important institutional decisions OCRWM will make. The states have been unanimous and consistent in their advocacy for consultation and cooperation in the route identification process. In 2004-2005, the Midwest undertook an ambitious project to identify possible rail and highway routes through the region, assuming Yucca Mountain as the destination. OCRWM did not follow up substantively on the Midwest’s project, nor did its own process of working through the TEC/WG move the process of route selection forward before the program was terminated in 2009.
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