SECURITY PLANNING Like all other components of a comprehensive transportation plan, OCRWM never produced a draft security plan for state input. Recognizing that there are “need to know” considerations, OCRWM will need to involve the states in developing the security plan for repository shipments. Early efforts to discuss security planning made some progress but were unable to accomplish much due to unclear direction and questions regarding the appropriate scope of activity. OCRWM should take lessons from those efforts to increase the chances of success in the future. Section 6 of the DOE Manual requires shipping programs to provide security “in compliance with NRC requirements in 10 CFR Part 73 for shipments subject to an NRC license” (DOE 2008f, p. 22). For other DOE shipments, the manual requires shippers to provide security “in a manner that meets or exceeds NRC security requirements” (ibid.). The manual states that “[s]pecific NRC requirements are considered Safeguards Information,” however it is noted that developing a security plan is among the requirements. Security was first identified as an OCRWM-related issue in the 1986 Transportation Institutional Plan in an original discussion paper on physical protection procedures. The paper discussed the distinction between NRC-licensee shipments and“DOE shipments of spent fuel generated in national defense activities and research and development,”with the former subject to NRC regulation while DOE provided its own guidance on“physical protection procedures” for shipments (DOE 1986c, p. A-22). The paper stated that “OCRWM has indicated its intent to comply with all NRC physical protection requirements that exist at the time of shipments of nuclear waste to NWPA facilities” (ibid., p. A-26). OCRWM intended to work with the NRC to address the “appropriate level of physical protection” necessary for NWPA shipments. As part of that coordination, OCRWM identified three issues for discussion that resulted from public comments on the Transportation Institutional Plan discussion paper: • The need to reconsider the necessity for secrecy requirements related to routing and scheduling information. • The potential need to reassess credible threats to shipments of radioactive waste and to ensure that physical protection requirements adequately protect against such threats. • The potential need to develop physical protection requirements for shipments of high-level waste (ibid., p. A-27). According to the Transportation Institutional Plan , OCRWM hoped to identify plans for addressing these three issues “by the spring of 1987” (ibid.). Security planning did not advance very far in the 1990s because of a program redirection that made transportation a low priority. After Congress officially selected the Yucca Mountain site in 2002, the topic of security planning took on more urgency. In 2004, OCRWM initiated its discussions of security with states, tribes, and other stakeholders in a closed-door session of a new Security Topic Group at the TEC/WG meeting in Minneapolis. The initial meeting was not
well planned and caused some concern among stakeholders that were active on the TEC/WG, particularly those that were excluded from the meeting. One participant noted that, while several long- standing TEC/WG members had been refused admittance to the meeting because of concerns over sensitive information being discussed, the members of the hotel’s banquet staff were freely admitted into the roomwhile those discussions were taking place. OCRWM continued to support the Security Topic Group through 2006, holding three more meetings and monthly conference calls from May 2005 through August 2006. Over this time period, the group reviewed and provided comments on an OCRWM report entitled “DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation: Lessons Learned from Security Planning and Execution” (DOE 2006b). The OCRWM staff described the report as being “only for information purposes” (TEC Security Topic Group 2006, p. 2). Although brief, the report contained some very specific, useful suggestions that any shipper, including OCRWM, could follow to improve security planning. Among the recommendations, OCRWM identified the general need to “balance information sharing with information protection, and ensure all involved parties understand requirements for protecting information appropriately” (ibid., p. 1). The report also noted that it was important to “develop a system-wide process for providing notifications to points-of-contact in the States, Tribes, railroads and other organizations” and to “freely share non-sensitive information”with entities that were helping to plan shipments (ibid., p. 2). As part of their work with the Security Topic Group, the regional groups, led by the Midwest, conducted a survey of the states on issues related to shipment security and other topics. The report included several recommendations for the states and OCRWM related to security planning and the protection of safeguards information. One recommendation encouraged OCRWM to“research the existing federal programs for training in protecting information to determine their strengths and weaknesses” (CSG Midwest et al. 2006, p. 2). The rationale for including this recommendation was that “slightly over half (18 of 35) the states reported that they do not have the resources necessary to train people on information security for a shipping campaign on the scale of the repository shipments” (ibid.). The survey also revealed that, while states “generally have established procedures for routine sharing of protected information, many states reported that they do not have specific procedures in place for sharing information in the event of an emergency” (ibid., p. 4). The report identified the development of model procedures as a possible task for the regional groups to undertake as part of their cooperative agreements with OCRWM (ibid.). While the Security Topic Group made some small contribution to resolving the issue of security planning, the group was very limited in its ability to delve deeply into the topic because of concerns over clearances. From the 2004 TEC/WG meeting, OCRWM intended to discuss security planning only with stakeholders that had or could obtain the appropriate clearances. The program even considered assisting stakeholders with obtaining the necessary clearances so that they could engage in detailed discussions. Up until the time the group had its last conference call in August 2006,
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