transportation planning efforts. Specifically, WGA would like to see terrorism and sabotage risk management and countermeasures incorporated into any plans to operate a repository, interim storage facility, or intermodal transfer station (WGA 2008b). These plans should include provisions for handling the liability from potential damages from an act of terrorism or sabotage against a nuclear waste shipment. In its “Report Card,”WIEB gave OCRWM a grade of “F” because, according to WIEB, OCRWM had not committed to taking any extra-regulatory measures to address the terrorism risk, instead stating that it will rely on NRC oversight to ensure the safety of repository shipments (WIEB, p. 4). In 1999, the state of Nevada petitioned the NRC to initiate rulemaking that would strengthen the regulations that protect spent fuel shipments from acts of terrorism or sabotage. The petition requested that NRC do the following: • clarify the meaning of the term“hand-carried equipment;” • clarify the definition of the term“radiological sabotage” to include actions against spent fuel shipments which are intended to cause a loss of shielding, release of radioactive materials or cause economic damage or social disruption, regardless of the success or failure of the action; • amend the advance route approval requirements to require shippers and carriers of spent fuel to identify primary and alternative routes which avoid heavily populated areas; • require armed escorts along the entire shipment route; • amend 10 CFR 73.37(b) by adopting additional planning and scheduling requirements for spent fuel shipments that are the same as those required for formula quantities of special nuclear material; • amend 10 CFR 73.37(d) to require that rail shipments of spent fuel be made in dedicated trains; and • conduct a comprehensive assessment of the consequences of terrorist attacks that have the capability of radiological sabotage (NRC 2009, p. 3). Nevada’s petition was endorsed by the eighteen Western states as well as five states from other regions of the country (Halstead et al. 2005). The NRC will attempt to address some of these concerns in an upcoming rulemaking expected in 2010.
NRC regulations attempt to minimize the threat and consequences of terrorist attacks or acts of sabotage (10 CFR 73.37). The regulations are intended to “1) minimize the possibilities for radiological sabotage of spent nuclear fuel shipments, especially in heavily populated areas, and 2) facilitate the location and recovery of spent nuclear fuel shipments that may have come under the control of unauthorized persons” (NRC 2009, p. 2). The regulations further encourage the early detection of potential threats, notification to emergency response agencies of acts of sabotage, and the impedance of sabotage attempts against spent fuel shipments in highly populated areas. OCRWM described the NRC protections against sabotage or terrorism against spent fuel shipments in Appendix M of the Yucca Mountain Final EIS: advance shipment notification to states; procedures for safeguards emergencies; continual monitoring of shipments through a communications center; a written shipment log documenting significant events; advance arrangements with law enforcement agencies along the route; NRC approval of the shipping route; avoidance of unnecessary stops; escorts trained to determine if a threat exists and how to deal with it, who maintain visual surveillance of the shipment during stops and report regularly on shipment status; onboard communication equipment; protection of certain shipment information; and armed escorts in high-population areas (DOE 2002, p. M-24). In addition to the procedures that have been established to minimize the terrorist threat, the casks designed specifically for transporting spent fuel provide physical protection against acts of sabotage or terrorism. In fact, 90 percent of the gross weight of the casks will be shielding, while only 10 percent will be the weight of the spent fuel (DOE 2002, p. M-24). Contractors for the state of Nevada laid out the state’s concerns regarding a potential terrorist attack on a spent fuel shipment in a paper delivered at the 2005 Waste Management Symposium. The authors asserted that, while the risk of an attack may be relatively low, the potential consequences would be high, and thus emergency response planners should plan for a successful terrorist attack that results in a significant release of radioactive material. They pointed to studies performed by OCRWM, the NRC, and the state of Nevada that suggest spent fuel casks are vulnerable to terrorist attacks that could result in the dispersal of radioactive material, and the health impacts of such dispersal would be major.
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