Transportation Institutional Issues: The Post Yucca Years

Shipment Information

One of the concerns expressed by the Nevada contractors is that, while shipping containers for spent fuel must be certified by the NRC, full-scale testing of the casks is not conducted (see the issue on Full-Scale Cask Testing ). Instead, the NRC relies on scale testing and computer simulation. The authors believe that such simulations are not credible unless validated by testing of actual casks under accident conditions (Halstead et al. 2005, p. 3). The importance of planning for an act of sabotage or terrorism against a spent fuel shipment will increase once the volume of shipments increases with the opening of a national repository or interim storage facility. The authors asserted that these shipments would be viewed as desirable targets for terrorists. Because the risk of a terrorist attack cannot be eliminated, Nevada has urged OCRWM and the NRC to plan for avoiding attacks but also mitigating the consequences of a potential attack. A major component of this recommendations aimed at reducing the risk of acts of terrorism and sabotage against shipments. The NAS found that “malevolent acts against spent fuel and high-level waste shipments are a major technical and societal concern” (NAS 2006, p. 214). The committee further noted that this risk is likely to increase once shipments to a repository or interim storage facility actually begin. The committee that authored the NAS report was unable to planning would be emergency response training. In the 2006 report Going the Distance , the NAS made complete an examination of transportation security because much of the necessary information was classified. The committee thus recommended that an independent group be given full access to security information and studies in order to complete a review of transportation security. The NAS recommended that this study evaluate the threat environment, the response of transportation packages to malevolent acts, and the current operational requirements related to transportation security. The group should be independent of the government and free from institutional and financial constraints in order to improve its objectivity and credibility with the public. In addition, the NAS recommended that the findings and recommendations from this group be made available to the public to the greatest extent possible (ibid., p.215). The NRC undertook several transportation security studies in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; however, the results of those studies are classified. In 2007, the regional groups sent a letter to the NRC requesting increased access to spent fuel package security information (Owen et al. 2007, p. 1). The regions provided the NRC with a matrix detailing the type of information the states wish to receive, how the information would be used, how the information would be protected and limited to those with a “need to know,” and who would use it. Specifically, the states would like the NRC to share general consequence information, such as potential health effects and required response, detailed consequence information on dispersal and contamination, general information on the scenarios evaluated by the NRC, assumptions and inputs used to evaluate those scenarios, and credible threat information related to spent fuel shipments (ibid., pp. 1-3). As of June 2010, the NRC had not responded to or provided feedback on the regions’matrix.

LONG-TERM PLANNING INFORMATION The DOE Manual requires departmental programs to provide states with long-term planning information so they can prepare for shipments. This information could include fact sheets on shipments, casks, and facilities, but equally important for states would be a safeguards-compliant version of DOE’s Projected Shipment Report. OCRWM did not develop a detailed plan for what kind of long-term planning information it would share, how, and how often. Section 4 of the DOE Manual describes “planning information” as “the general information regarding projected shipments that is shared with State and Tribal authorities to allow them to adequately plan resources for inspections, emergency response, accident prevention, and public information/outreach activities” (DOE 2008f, p. 14). To facilitate the provision of such information to states, the manual directs the “cognizant DOE organization, field office and shippers” to“establish an ongoing dialogue…with State and Tribal agencies” (ibid.). The manual leaves it up to the responsible DOE office to determine what kind of information to provide, who should receive it, how frequently, and by what method (ibid., pp. 14-15). Among the type of information suggested were shipping mode, potential route, DOE/contractor point of contact, and the expected number of shipments (ibid., p. 15). The manual specifically referenced the DOE “Prospective Shipments Module” (now“Projected Shipment Report”or PSR) as a suitable method for providing information on spent fuel, HRCQ, and other campaigns “after the NEPA process is completed” (ibid.). The Midwestern states have endorsed the PSR as a “tool for providing the states with information on upcoming shipments of spent nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, and other radioactive materials” (MRMTC 2008a, p. 12). Since 2005, the region has also suggested several ways to improve upon the existing PSR – even creating a prototype to demonstrate the type of improved functionality the states were seeking. The states’ suggestions include customizing the reports to make them state-specific; providing links to fact sheets, route maps, transportation plans, images of the shipping containers, and other shipment-related information; and identifying site points of contact so that states can obtain additional information. In 2006, the Midwest led the regional groups’ effort to survey the states regarding their information needs. The survey was conducted for the purpose of informing the work of the TEC/ WG Security Topic Group (see the section on Security Planning ). States were asked about the specific pieces of information they might need in connection with truck shipments, train shipments, or both. Examples of the type of information include detailed

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