Defense Acquisition Research Journal #91

Complexity in an Unexpected Place: Quantities in Selected Acquisition Reports

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In general, splitting a new acquisition into multiple programs is rarely appropriate. An example of a program that perhaps should have been split into multiple programs is the Stryker (originally “Interim Armored Vehicle”) program. This program involved procurement of eight specialized variants of an existing nondevelopmental armored vehicle. Of these eight variants, six were relatively minor modifications of the existing design, while two 11 required extensive engineering changes to the original. An appropriate program management strategy would have been to make the six “minor modifcation” variants a single program (with six subprograms), and the twomajor redesigns either a second programwith two subprograms, or two additional separate programs. That would have isolated the development risks of the twomost risky projects from themore straightforward projects, and would have given OSD and the Congress better visibility of how the various projects were progressing. As it happened, the Stryker program experienced a signifcant (but not critical) N-M breach, driven entirely by problems in the two major redesign vehicles. Different Cost Categories. Using the different cost categories in current SAR reporting can give some visibility into what is happening in a program, but generally does not allow better identifcation of diferent unit types. The distinction between end items and non-end items was not designed to capture diferences among multiple distinct end items. The Air Force’s MQ-9 Reaper UAS program plans to procure 347 units, where each unit is an aircraft. The total procurement cost for the program is $9.2 billion in BY 2008 dollars, but only 52%of that is EIRF. Another 22% is categorized as NEIRF, and the remaining 26% is Total Support. This information is useful for cost analysts, although this distribution has no impact on N-M reporting. 12 The aircraft quantity can be compared to the EIRF to understand those units, but no quantities are reported for ground stations, so an analyst can only knowwhat has been spent on them in total, not what each costs. In this case, NEIRF is something like a subprogram for the ground stations, but it is less transparent than actual subprograms would be. Reducing Accidents When humans carry out activities, accidents are inevitable. Reducing accidents requires good processes. We have not analyzed the process for generating SARs or PB submissions. In principle, that could (and perhaps should) be done from a quality assurance point of view.

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Defense ARJ, January 2020, Vol. 27No. 1 : 28-59

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