Colour experience: the example of Mary
Ali Neden
In Frank JacksonÊs ÂPhilosophy of Mind and CognitionÊ, he sets forward the example of Mary. Now Mary lives in a black and white world. Her clothes are black and white, her house is black and white; everything is black and white. Thus to her there is no experience of colour. However se can learn about the physical experience of colour by reading about it in her black and white library. Now what will happen if suddenly one day she does see the colour red? What will be her subjective experience? Will her qualia be exactly what she read in her books? Or will her experience be so radically different to her understanding that it must have a non- physical aspect? The answer to this question has troubled philosophers throughout the ages and has led to three distinct categories of theory: dualism, materialism and what has come to be known as transcendentnaturalism. Dualism is the idea that there is a clear difference between physical and mental aspects. That is, that, what you think, feel, desire have very little in common with physical properties. We will look at the different types of dualism and discuss the effect that JacksonÊs example has. The two main strands of dualism are substance dualism and attribute dualism. Substance dualists argue that there are two types of matter, physical and mental, and that they lead to distinct properties. Attribute dualists maintain there is one type of matter, only physical matter, and that physical and mental properties inhere within that with mental properties inhering within special matter for example the brain. They would both propose that experience has a non-physical (mental) aspect.
Now how does MaryÊs example affect these stances? There are three main areas to focus on. First is the argument for dualism known as LeibnizÊs law that states that if x=y that all aspects of ÂxÊ are identical to all aspects of ÂyÊ. This is clearly not the case as Mary might know from a physical point of view what seeing red is, but not from a mental view. Thus physical properties are not identical to mental properties; a quick, easy argument for dualism. Thomas Nagel also points this out when he argues that although we may know how bats avoid objects, we will never know what itÊs like to be a bat. That leads us onto our second argument: that subjective experience is greatly different from physical knowledge of experience. Our feeling when eating ice- cream s so distant to our physical knowledge that the taste buds are causing neurons in the brain to realize that sensation, that there must be a non-physical aspect to the experience. This is the same wit Mary. The shock of seeing red for the first time is so different to her knowledge that it suggests mental aspects. Thirdly, there is the argument that if we are purely physical we are just complex machines. *See other page Epiphenomenalism states that although physical properties can cause mental properties, mental properties cannot cause physical properties. This is at odds with MaryÊs example as when seeing red (mental) she might exclaim wonder (physical). Thus epiphenomenalism is troubled. There are other types of dualism, chiefly epiphenomenalism and parallelism.
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