The explanatory gap: physical facts and the facts of consciousness
Harry Goodhew
Introduction
Explaining the Gap.
In this essay, I will explore the explanatory gap. I will begin by explaining why some philosophers have proposed the idea of such a gap and then explore the ways in which they attempt to bridge this gap. Next I will explore why such a gap is appearing and that such a gap is, in fact, unnecessary, concluding with evidence which supports the materialistic view in which there is no gap. Many Dualist philosophers believe that, even after all of the physical processes behind the brainÊs function, such as the integration of information and other so- called easy problems have been solved, there will still remain the Âhard problem of consciousnessÊ (Chalmers 1994). This problem tried to explain why we have an experience of, for example, the colour red, when certain neurons fire, they believe that it would be impossible for such an experience to be explored by purely reductive means and therefore we are left with an explanatory gap. Importantly, this gap should persist even when we know everything about the brain as there is no way in which the mechanical processes in the brain can explain conscious experiences. This belief is, of course, the basis of dualism, that there is something beyond the physical brain and its functions that are required to explain consciousness. Therefore they have proposed solutions to this gap, which attempt to bridge it using non-reductive means. Why the Gap?
Some philosophers, the so-called Mysterians, claim that this gap is inexplicable and that, through limitations posed by our brains, we cannot even attempt to explain consciousness. This position is understandably not held by many as it is an admission of the failure of the philosophy of mind before they have even tried it. However, the dualists themselves are unable to explain the gap. Chalmers suggested that consciousness can be explained, like physical phenomena, through the examinations of basic principles. He proposed three such principles which try to explain the hard problem. The most important of these was the third, fundamental principle, with the other two merely acting as constraints to this, the duality of information. He also explained why we will never succeed in bridging the gap through reductive means as these merely explain the function of the brain and so can only help to solve the easy problems, they are unable to answer why we experience pain or odours. Furthermore, Chalmers rebuts several claims which have attempted to solve his hard problems, suggesting that these merely pretend to be explaining why we have experiences and they progress to an explanation of one of the easier problems. An example of this which he gives is Crick and KochÊs thesis that certain oscillations of the brain produce consciousness as they were shown to be triggered by exercises that require conscious thought. ChalmersÊ argument was that this merely showed that they were correlates to conscious thought
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