degree. Why would it be the case that a chimpanzee is capable of passing the test every time but other apes cannot? Similarly, why would such behaviour arise in dolphins or magpies which are very distantly related to humans and what determines whether or not animals are granted this ability or to what extent they have it? At the same time, this appears to be a problem for materialism too, if consciousness evolved then why should dolphins have it but not closer human relatives? Is it not odd that such a trait evolved twice? However, this variation in behaviour is explainable from a materialistÊs viewpoint, all systems which integrate information should be conscious, and the extent of this consciousness is not determined by the number of nodes but the number of connections between them. This is supposedly the fact that the regions of the brain thought to produce consciousness contain, despite being smaller, far more connections than other regions. However, this would also change our idea of what it means to be conscious, unlike NagelÊs proposal that something is conscious if there is something it is like to be that thing, this leads us to the conclusion that everything in which information is integrated, is conscious, including machines.
cells associated in humans, with conscious regions. These could help to explain why some animals appear to be conscious and others do not as they, in some way, [improve] the integration of information associated with consciousness. At the moment, however, this suggestion is purely speculative and based on a correlation. Similarly, these cells are also present in animals which do not appear to exhibit signs of consciousness, although in those animals their distribution is far more random, leading to the suggestion that they were adopted to allow better decision-making, resulting in a more conscious system in the few animals which pass the mirror test. In conclusion, I believe that there is no explanatory gap. This is because, from a materialist perspective, there is no need to explain why neuronal firings or oscillations generate experience because those activities by the brain are the experiences that they ÂcauseÊ. 2 Although this belief is inconsistent with our intuitions I believe that it is correct on the basis of my argument for materialism over dualism and believe that it is vital that we accept these intuitions as false in order that we can account for them and overcome them. Conclusion
Furthermore, conscious animals tend to have more Von Economo cells, specialized brain
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