is absolute but can only be understood in terms of its attributes by finite minds.
The objectivist rejects this view as it goes against Spinoza’s later stated
proposition that finite minds can in fact have an adequate understanding of Gods
essence (Spinoza, Ethics (1677) 2P47). The objectivist Johnathan Bennett
explains Spinoza’s understanding of the difference between substance and
attributes instead as being “the difference between a substance and an
adjectival presentation of the very same content.” (Bennett, J. 1984) or simply
put the difference between substance itself and its description. Objectivists
claim this interpretation allows for real knowledge of Spinoza’s world view,
rather than the illusionary one given by subjectivists. However, the objectivist
view does come with the risk of losing the unity of substance if too fine a
distinction between attributes is used. Whilst these concerns are indeed
important for understanding Spinoza’s term attribute, it must also be noted that
as substance cannot be conceived of without using the attribute of thought,
which in turn is a substance, it seems that at a fundamental level substance must
be considered as inseparable from at least some of its attributes and that this
maybe part of the reason Spinoza labels some attributes as being ‘eternal
attributes’.
However, Spinoza’s notion of substance does seem to have bearing on the
modern idea of panpsychism. In panpsychism, consciousness is seen as primary
(or even the only primary substance) and most such theories run into issues with
the combination problem, notably subject summing. Spinoza’s unified substance
seems relevant here, with a formless ‘substance’ that takes on ‘attributes’ and
‘modes’ that distinguish it from its own self. This could be likened to a smaller
more primitive consciousness, that takes on ever more distinct forms of self-
awareness (likened to attributes), and reasoning (likened to modes) as it grows
towards our understanding of intellect and even beyond.
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