In conclusion Spinoza’s formulation of substance seems difficult to fully
understand, and possibly even incoherent. Spinoza’s substance is featureless and
identical with God, while still being able to take on ‘attributes’ and in the
example of God infinite attributes which is logically sound, but Spinoza also
appears to conceive of separate substances within this passage which itself
seems to suggest multiple substances. This seems inconsistent as by Spinoza’s
definition the only thing separating substance from itself is the attribute it is
‘holding’ at that time (or eternally), and by this account the attributes appear
more necessary than the substance from which they are formed, yet Spinoza
seems to deem attributes as merely perceptual qualities. If true this departs
from Spinoza’s monism. Another criticism might be that Spinoza’s definition of
God is somewhat circular, as in the corollary to proposition 11 Spinoza states that
“a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause that prevents it from
existing” and gives the evidence of contradiction, but no example of why it would
be contractionary for God or such a substance to not exist. If the argument for
proposition 11 is laid out with formal logic, you get the following:
P1) A7) If a thing can be conceived as not existing then its essence doesn’t
involve existence.
P2) P7) It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist
C) It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist, so it must be conceived of as
existing as its essence involves existence
But this amounts to saying a substance exists because it is existence, or it exists
because it exists.
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