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characterized by world-class thrust, unmatched reliability, and enviable safety records. Still, propulsion competitions have become characterized by generational winner-take-all decisions (Mayes, 1988). In his Accelerate Change or Lose guidance to the Air Force, then U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen C. Q. Brown stated, “Air Dominance is not an American birthright” (Air Force Chief of Staff, 2020). The DoD must replicate the lessons of the First Great Engine War to ensure we maintain propulsion dominance. The next Great Engine War has stagnated because the DoD needs to build a requirements and cost-informed propulsion roadmap that drives technology investment and promotes competition. Furthermore, although the AETP failed to transition to the F-35, the program successfully maintained a competitive industrial base through an extended development phase, ready for renewed competition for sixth-generation and beyond applications. The DoD does not need to field systems with dual-source engines as long as it designs technology development pathways like AETP and follows up with a transition to programs of record to maintain a healthy two-vendor propulsion industrial base. Great Engine War Background Despite unmatched air superiority since the 1950s, the Vietnam War served as a stark reminder that technology must continue to evolve to stay ahead of the adversary. After experiencing loss rates of one aircraft per 12 enemy aircraft in Korea, the United States lost one aircraft for every 2.5 enemy aircraft shot down in Vietnam (Drewes, 1987, p. 10). To counter emerging Soviet threats, the Air Force initiated the F-X program, which eventually evolved to become the F-15. Furthermore, despite Service disagreements, DoD leadership forced the Air Force and Navy to start a joint engine development program since the engine requirements for the Navy’s F-14 program were similar enough to the F-15 to utilize a common engine (pp. 12–14). The Air Force was chosen as the lead Service. Desiring to take advantage of numerous advancements in propulsion technology, the Air Force sent Requests for Proposal (RFPs) to GE, P&W, and the Allison Division of General Motors, seeking to double the thrust-to-weight ratio of currently available engines (Camm, 1993). In February 1970, after hardware testing, the Air Force selected P&W’s F100 engine, although GE’s offering was compelling. Drewes (1987) identified the reasons for such selection in historical documents on F-15 engine development:
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Defense ARJ , Summer 2025, Vol. 32 No. 2: 104—130
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