The Next Great Engine War Was Not What You Thought It Was
… it was felt GE had a better engine structurally and control-wise but a higher risk fan in the stability area. The P&W aircraft engine was assessed to be considerably heavier and lacking a real control system but had a fan/ compressor with more potential to meet specifications. P&W also demonstrated a greater understanding of engine/inlet compatibility phenomena. (p. 31)
Over the next few years, technical challenges and component testing delays began to mount. Furthermore, delays in the Navy’s F-14B program significantly increased, eventually causing the cancellation of the procurement of Navy engines. According to Drewes, the Navy’s cancellation forced the Air Force to renegotiate a now sole-source contract with P&W, yielding a $522 million cost increase. Seeking to reconstitute a larger engine buy after the Navy pulled out of the F100 program, the Air Force also selected a variation of the F100 for its F-16 fighter. Shortly after fielding, in 1974, the F100 engine began to experience two serious issues: stall stagnation that required the pilot to shut down and restart the engine in flight and an extremely short life that drove up operations and sustainment costs. As detailed in a RAND study led by Frank Camm, the conditions for the Great Engine War were set. Since the Air Force had granted numerous schedule and testing concessions during development, the Air Force wanted P&W to fix these problems. However, P&W argued that they had met the engine specifications and
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Defense ARJ , Summer 2025, Vol. 32 No. 2: 104—130
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