The Next Great Engine War Was Not What You Thought It Was
better responsiveness and performance by P&W and to have a standby, demonstrated technology. Fast-forward a few years, in 1981, the Air Force was ready to initiate a real competition to replace the F100 and issued a Request for Information to the companies asking what the Air Force could expect from a competitive proposal.
P&W and GE continued developing their engines to include higher thrust models that could meet emerging requirements and were eager to compete. In 1983, the Air Force issued an RFP stating that consideration would be given to the effects of “dual awards,” offering the first clue that the Air Force was considering a split purchase. However, in public messaging, the Air Force emphasized it had no preconceived plan to split the requirement. The RFP solicited contractors to submit proposals for an estimated 2,000 engines and offer prices for multiple procurement profiles, including single-year and multiyear options for possible Navy procurements. After months of evaluation, in February 1984, the Air Force announced a split award of a single year’s engines: 120 GE engines for F-16s and 40 P&W engines for F-15s. Because of the pricing matrix in the contractors' proposals, the source selection authority chose to award only a single year and allow the contractors' performance and field experience to influence future year procurements. Surprisingly, P&W nearly lost all of the engines in that first year, as their proposal included a step function in the pricing matrix so that costs increased significantly if anything less than a 100% buy occurred. Believing that continuing to foster competition for the engines was necessary, the Air Force gave P&W a share of the initial award despite the increased price (Drewes, 1987, pp. 117–118, 126–127).
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Defense ARJ , Summer 2025, Vol. 32 No. 2: 104—130
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