Defense Acquisition Research Journal #109

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Though controversial, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that the Air Force’s decision to split the procurement was reasonable despite the increased costs of a dual award, and that the competition and source selection procedures were fair (GAO, 1984). Additionally, GAO concluded that the Air Force’s recognition of other perceived benefits, such as the potential for additional future savings, increased contractor responsiveness, an enlarged industrial base, and protection from production disruptions, were reasonable factors to consider. Over the next few years, competition drove each company to compete for a larger share of the annual quantity by offering lower prices and improving customer relations. The strategy appeared to work, with procurement quantities shifting over the next few years back to P&W's favor, as detailed in Table 1 (Mayes, 1988). TABLE 1. ENGINE PROCUREMENT QUANTITIES AND PERCENT BY FISCAL YEAR Fiscal Year GE (Quantity / Percent) P&W (Quantity / Percent) FY85 120 / 75% 40 / 25% FY86 184 / 54% 159 / 46% FY87 205 / 56% 160 / 44% FY88 147 / 45% 181 / 55% FY89 100 / 39% 159 / 61% FY90 39 / 36% 70 / 64% Total 795 / 51% 769 / 49% The primary outcome of the Great Engine War was GE’s success in reentering the large fighter engine market by unseating the incumbent, an infrequent occurrence in DoD procurement practice. When the Air Force announced its decision to split future purchases in February 1984, P&W had delivered over 3,000 engines valued at over $10 billion (Ogg, 1987, p. 15). Today, GE and P&W are still competing as the F-15 and F-16 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) markets remain strong, and the U.S. Air Force is acquiring the new F-15EX powered by GE’s F110. Despite P&W's head start, the Great Engine War ended in a near 50/50 split, as GE has produced 3,400 F110 engines, while P&W has produced more than 3,800 F100 engines (GE, 2019; Mayes, 1988; P&W, n.d.). It is challenging to ascertain whether competition yielded the $3 billion savings the Air Force estimated over 20 years. However, a case can be made that competition ensured the United States had two viable engine suppliers that produced world-class engines with unmatched reliability and safety.

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Defense ARJ , Summer 2025, Vol. 32 No. 2: 104—130

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