The Next Great Engine War Was Not What You Thought It Was
progressing well, and that anticipated savings from competition would not offset the upfront development cost (Younossi et al., 2002). Congress rejected the termination, restored funding, and kept the program funded in 2008, 2009, and 2010 despite continued termination in the DoD budget requests. Finally, in 2011, Congress agreed to terminate, and funding ceased (Gertler, 2012). Although the program was eventually canceled, many officials expressed concern that the termination was driven more by near-term budget pressures than the long-term potential benefits. On the other hand, some officials applauded the decision, stating that single-source production contracts are the best strategy for long-term affordability. Congressional testimony was also mixed, with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testifying that the merits were “clearly debatable” and Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne testifying that he was worried about the “downstream effects” of the decision. Regardless, the DoD and Air Force continually argued that despite the concerns of senior leaders, the F136 did not make sense from a pure “business case,” hinting that other factors, such as industrial base capacity and resilience, weighed on the decision (Murch & Bolkcom, 2008). Numerous studies were commissioned to argue the merits of the alternate engine, including one by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD CAIG), which noted that although skeptical of the financial benefits, nonmonetary benefits could be gained. The most notable potential benefit concerned the need for growth potential in the JSF engine. The OSD CAIG report predicted that the engine would eventually need to be upgraded for additional thrust. Since the F135 was already close to exceeding design temperature specifications, it would require further modifications beyond the F136
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Defense ARJ , Summer 2025, Vol. 32 No. 2: 104—130
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