Defense Acquisition Research Journal #109

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Lessons Learned from AETP Similarities and differences of AETP come to light when examined in the context of the previous Great Engine Wars. • First, both the F110 and the AETP engines were initiated to improve baseline engine performance and remove technology limitations in current engines. • Second, the F110 and AETP were both direct responses to adversary air superiority threats and intended to improve or maintain technological advantage. Technological advantages greatly reduced aircraft loss rates in Vietnam and demonstrated the importance of superior engine performance, yielding improved engine requirements to counter emerging Soviet threats. While AETP was less about countering explicit Soviet and Chinese aircraft, the DoD understood the risk posed by China’s stated goal and complementary investment to become a preeminent global propulsion provider (Holderness et al., 2023). • Third, both programs were intentionally designed to ensure that the U.S. duopolistic fighter engine industrial base remained viable. Ironically, in both cases, GE was viewed as the contractor needing additional funding to stay viable; however, the outcomes were very different, as the F110 became a mainstay in the fourth-generation fighter fleet, while GE’s XA100 remains a prototype engine without a clear path to transition. • Fourth, the programs were initiated in both cases without a specific aircraft identified for transition. The F110 was initially started to provide GE funding to stay competitive behind the $2 billion investment the Air Force had made with P&W. It was also intended to build competitive pressure on P&W, which had challenged the Air Force on F100 requirements. Similarly, AETP began as a technology demonstrator. Although each company chose to build an F-35-sized engine, that was more a function of being the right size and the only fighter aircraft currently in production. Despite so many similarities to the First Great Engine War, AETP did have some differences that became significant obstacles to replicating the success of the First Great Engine War.

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Defense ARJ , Summer 2025, Vol. 32 No. 2: 104—130

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