The Next Great Engine War Was Not What You Thought It Was
• First, the F-35 is a joint program with international partners and FMS countries. Although the F110 program was initially started as a joint Air Force/Navy program, the Navy quickly withdrew, leaving a sole Service responsible for the development. • Second, not only is the F-35 a joint and international program, but the Services each have different configurations of aircraft and engines based on whether the aircraft is CTOL or STOVL. Since the program relies on cost-sharing agreements based on global fleet procurements, any deviation from the common configuration disrupts the entire community. Since the AETP prototypes were intentionally incompatible with the STOVL variant, fielding AETP threatened to strand the relatively small pool of F-35B users with an engine that struggled to meet life and powered lift requirements. • Third, the BCA that informed the F-35 propulsion modernization decisions was diluted by many other factors that minimized the impact of increased range for the F-35. Although the engine options were the primary factors early in the BCA, the uncertainty of emerging power and thermal requirements drove substantial complexities into both the cost and technical analysis that were not fully understood when the BCA was concluded. Personnel involved in the BCA desired additional time to understand these complexities; however, the pressure of making a decision to inform the FY 2024 President’s Budget limited flexibility in the schedule (anonymous personal communication, January 17, 2024). Conclusions and Recommendations Although the final chapter of the AETP story may not have been written, the FY 2024 President’s Budget decision to terminate the program provides an opportunity to reflect on whether AETP accomplished the goals that it set out to deliver, as well as what decisions could have been made differently to transition the technology to the Warfighter. If the goal of AETP was to transition technology to the Warfighter, the program failed. AETP was always a program without a transition path. In hindsight, the Air Force should have been more explicit about the platform AETP intended to support. If the Air Force wanted to field AETP to the F-35, the partnership with the JPO should have been established at the start. Since it was not, the JPO was not interested until it became a potential solution to a problem. On the contrary, perhaps
124
Defense ARJ , Summer 2025, Vol. 32 No. 2: 104—130
Made with FlippingBook - Online Brochure Maker