The Next Great Engine War Was Not What You Thought It Was
maturation programs like AETP should continue beyond a competitive down-select to ensure the losing company remains viable. One of the weaknesses of AETP was that while it strongly supported the design engineering phases of engine development, it was minimally effective at exercising the manufacturing and sustainment phases of an engine life cycle. • Third, the Air Force needs to develop propulsion technology at a threat-relevant cadence. Since no true competition from defense contractors emerged for the F-35 engine, the Air Force has only developed three generations of engines in 40 years (F100/F110, F119/F135, and AETP). With the exception of the First Great Engine War, they have all been winner-take-all competitions—an environment that in many industrial sectors is a recipe for monopolies. Although programs like AETP have provided the resources to keep competition alive, the Air Force needs to leverage commercial engine development mechanisms to shorten development life cycles. Tools such as digital engineering, multiyear funding arrangements, and transition plans need to be leveraged by the DoD. All things considered, the various engine wars teach the Air Force a great deal about how to manage propulsion programs successfully. However, none have been as successful as the first due to the winner-take-all strategies employed. To maximize effectiveness, the Air Force needs to leverage the lessons learned from AETP and apply them to the future. In doing so, the Service can ensure that a healthy, technologically advanced, and agile fighter engine industrial base remains postured to win the coming Great Power Competition.
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Defense ARJ , Summer 2025, Vol. 32 No. 2: 104—130
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