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Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 68 / Thursday, April 8, 2004 / Notices
6 As explained in footnote 2, some additional materials are currently stored at 50 additional sites (54 at the time of site recommendation), consisting primarily of research reactors, in four additional states, but DOE plans to consolidate these materials at two DOE sites for reasons unrelated to its repository plans. In any event, in the Yucca Mountain Development Act, Pub. L. 107–200, Congress directed DOE to proceed with the development of a license application for a repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. DOE believes that this statute and the NWPA make it incumbent on DOE repository at Yucca Mountain, including transportation, would cause relatively small public health impacts through the period 10,000 years after repository closure and would cause fewer public health impacts than the No-Action Alternative. For the No-Action Alternative with institutional controls for 10,000 years, the potential long-term environmental impacts also would be small, but significantly greater than the proposed action because the potential for nonradiological fatalities to workers under this alternative is significantly greater. Additional information may be found on pages S–82 through S–88 and Chapters 2 and 7 of the Final EIS. The cost of this No-Action Alternative is also significantly greater than that of the proposed action ($42.7 billion to $57.3 billion (in 2001 dollars) for the proposed action versus $167 billion to $184 billion for the first 300 years of institutional control and $519 million to $572 million per year thereafter). Additionally, the public health and safety impacts of the No-Action Alternative without effective institutional control are significantly greater than the proposed action. Likewise, in the long run, securing these materials by consolidating them and disposing of them in a secure, remote location, better protects against terrorist attack than leaving them at 72 commercial and 5 DOE sites in 35 states within 75 miles of more than 161 million Americans. 6 Moreover, for the reasons expressed by the Secretary and the President in their site recommendations and by the Congress in passing the joint resolution, it is in the national interest to move forward with this project. sufficiently distinct to make any of them clearly environmentally preferable. Although the potential impacts of any of the transportation alternatives would be small, they would be greater than the transportation-related impacts of the No-Action Alternatives. Overall however, as analyzed in the Final EIS, the impacts of proceeding with construction and operation of a
to proceed with appropriate transportation planning so the
4 See Duke Cogema Stone & Webster, 56 N.R.C. 335 (2002); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002); Duke Energy Corp., 56 N.R.C. 358 (2002); Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 56 N.R.C. 367 (2002); Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 57 N.R.C. 1 (2003); and Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 58 N.R.C. 185 (2003), appeal docketed, No. 03–74628 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2003). 5 See materials cited in footnote 4 and associated differences among alternatives also very small. The Department does not consider the differences among modes to be would occur under the legal-weight truck alternative. The Department also evaluated the risk of sabotage, including terrorism. For reasons the NRC has carefully explained, this analysis is most likely not required by NEPA. 4 It is not possible to predict whether such acts would occur and, if they did, the nature of such acts. Moreover, such analysis does not advance the public participation purpose of NEPA, since there are serious limits on what information can responsibly be disseminated on these issues without risking disclosure of information that might be used in planning or carrying out such an act. 5 Nevertheless, the Final EIS includes the consequences of a potentially successful attempt on a cask during shipment via rail or legal-weight truck. In both instances, a successful attack would result in the release of contaminants into the environment. The consequences estimated for a rail shipment would be less than those estimated for a legal- weight truck shipment, mostly because the thicker shield wall of the heavier rail cask would tend to mitigate the effects of the sabotage event when compared to the lighter, legal-weight truck transportation cask. None of the three transportation scenarios analyzed in the Final EIS is clearly environmentally preferable. Each would result in some impact to the environment, and public health and safety, although all impacts would be small. For example, transporting by either rail or heavy-haul truck in Nevada would result in some land disturbance, although the impacts would be greater for rail because more land would be disturbed during the construction of a rail line than during the upgrading of existing highways to accommodate heavy-haul trucks. Radiation exposure to workers and the public from either routine rail or truck shipments to the repository at Yucca Mountain would be very small, and the differences among the different modes of transportation also would be very small. Similarly, accident risks under each alternative would be very small,
Department will be in a position to fulfill its responsibility under the NWPA to begin disposal of this material promptly, should the NRC grant the necessary authorizations for it to do so. Transportation-Related Comments on the Final EIS DOE distributed about 6,200 copies of the Final EIS and has received written comments on the Final EIS from the White Pine County Nuclear Waste Project Office, White Pine County Board of County Commissioners, Board of County Commissioners Lincoln County, Board of Mineral County Commissioners, and a member of the public. Although comments were received on a variety of issues, the following summation addresses only those few comments related to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to a Yucca Mountain repository. Commenters stated that DOE should develop specific transportation-related mitigation measures, and encouraged DOE to do so in a cooperative manner. Commenters also stated that additional, more detailed and community-specific transportation analyses are needed for purposes of mitigation planning, as well as to support DOE in its transportation decisionmaking, such as the decision on the mode of transportation. Commenters also encouraged DOE to develop plans for transportation, such as route selection for shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, and emergency planning and response. Commenters also requested clarification of the roles of the NRC and DOE’s transportation services contractors, and whether counties are eligible for technical assistance and funding under Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). As discussed below in Use of All Practicable Means to Avoid or Minimize Harm (Parts I and II), DOE has already adopted measures to avoid or minimize environmental harm that could result from the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Additional potential mitigation measures associated with the construction of a rail line will be identified during preparation of an environmental impact statement that considers alternative alignments within the Caliente corridor for construction of the rail line (see PART II of this ROD). DOE also will consult with states, Native American tribes, local governments, utilities, the transportation industry and other interested parties in a cooperative
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