existential threats that include not only nuclear weapons but a huge variety of other deadly military tech- nologies. Current conflicts involving Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran demonstrate the lethality and wide- spread use of these technologies. The current era is one of Great Power Competition (GPC). The pri- mary defining characteristic, termed in China as civil-military fusion, in- volves government access to all militarily useful information, includ- ing that of the private sector. Similar policies apply in other hostile dicta- torships, including Russia, Iran, and North Korea. In stark contrast, U.S. policy, framed in law and tradition, is that all services and processes not clearly within the government domain belong in private hands. In 1987, the DoD accounted for about 40 percent of all U.S. research and development (R&D). In 2022, 78 percent of U.S. R&D was done by the commercial sector. The Federal Gov- ernment’s share was 18 percent, with only 37 percent by DoD. That means that in 2022, DoD was responsible for 6.6 percent of R&D in the United States. Not surprisingly, DoD out- sources upwards of 60 percent of its budget for goods and services, includ- ing R&D. DoD today must seek “emerging technology” from the commercial sec- tor to meet GPC military challenges. But commercial companies that are at the forefront of innovation in emerg- ing technologies are reluctant to work with DoD due to the complexity of the defense acquisition process. Defense acquisition professionals adhere to extremely long, detailed, and Byz- antine requirements and procedures specified in excruciating detail by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Acquisition professionals have zero incentive to take a chance of violat- ing one or more of the thousands of FAR pitfalls; they are, not surprisingly, risk-averse, as superbly analyzed in the recent Defense Innovation Board report, “Aligning Incentives to Drive Faster Tech Adoption.”
Defense acquisition professionals adhere to extremely long, detailed, and Byzantine requirements and procedures specified in excruciating detail by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Acquisition professionals have zero incentive to take a chance of violating one or more of the thousands of FAR pitfalls; they are, not surprisingly, risk-averse, as superbly analyzed in the recent Defense Innovation Board report, “Aligning Incentives to Drive Faster Tech Adoption.”
If one examines the challenges facing acquisition professionals, and particularly the 35,000 contracting officers and 20,000 program man- agers, their risk aversion is easily un- derstood. First, the demands on the acquisi- tion professionals are tremendous as they are personally responsible for a great number of requirements. Second, acquisition professionals are a totally separate cadre from the Warfighters and are not collocated with them. Therefore, they lack an incentive that could instill solidarity with the Warfighters, whose lives may well depend on the defense systems for which acquisition personnel do, or do not, contract. It is important to note that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), where acqui- sitions are clearly in support of the Warfighters, has different acquisition authorities from the rest of DoD and mixes Warfighters with technical sup- port civilian personnel. Third, while the contracting ca- reer field involves extensive training
and at least three software packages on generating FAR contracts, until very recently, virtually no training or education was available on using al- ternative acquisition authorities, and certainly no software. What training is available today on alternative ac- quisition authorities is more for firms seeking contracts than for those who award them. In my opinion, the heavy reliance on the FAR is not a cause of risk-averse acquisition, but rather a useful means to ensure it. Therefore, it is not surprising that acquisition professionals are risk-averse. They have no incentive to be anything else. Admittedly, examples of inno- vation in DoD outsourcing include SOCOM, and more recently, the rapid stand-up of the Space Force, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the Office of Strategic Capital, and the Replicator Initiative. But I agree with the July 2024 report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy of July 2024 (p. vi) that these examples remain the exception rather than the rule.
34 | DEFENSE ACQUISITION | May-June 2025
Made with FlippingBook - Online Brochure Maker