Conflict, Inequality, and the Provision of Public Good in a Model of Location Choice Abhra Roy Coles Research Symposium on Homeland Security, Special Issue, SIFALL22-04, October 2022
OVERVIEW
We analyze a model of conflict between an insurgency and a government. The median voter chooses an equilibrium tax rate and the government chooses how much to allocate to defense. The media outlet reports on the value of the public good. The insurgents choose the probability and the location of the attack. We compare between two scenarios: a) when the government is only concerned about security and b) when it maximizes welfare. We find that under security concern, a rise in media bias regardless of political spin causes a lower provision of the public good and moves the location of attack closer to the rural region than under welfare concern, however, with higher probability. The location of attack moves closer to the urban region under welfare concern. Finally, we show that the effect of inequality on the location of attack changes depending on whether or not the government is welfare maximizing.
32 | Coles Research Symposium
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