Dynamic Model of Conflict with Endogenous Destruction: The Role of Motivation Leo MacDonald and Aniruddha Bagchi Coles Research Symposium on Homeland Security, Special Issue, SIFALL22-03, October 2022
OVERVIEW
We consider a contest for a territory between two countries that differ in their rationales for fighting. Suppose one wants to win for primarily ideological reasons (e.g., shared heritage, ethnicity, religion), and the other for primarily economic reasons (e.g., access to natural resources). The economic value of the territory declines over time proportional to the intensity of the conflict, which has a stronger adverse impact on the economically motivated country. Thus, other factors remaining the same, we find the ideologically motivated country has a better chance of winning because it allocates a higher share of resources to armaments and a lower share to consumption during every period. In contrast, the economically motivated country initially allocates a high share of resources to armaments but less as the war lingers. Its citizens are willing to sacrifice consumption only in the initial stages, which is a disadvantage over the long haul. However, this disadvantage is erased if its initial valuation of the territory is significantly higher than that of the ideologically motivated country. We find no change in the chance of winning, even if the two countries have different initial endowments.
40 | Coles Research Symposium
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