Wage & Hour Class And Collective Action Review – 2025

Nissan and granted its motion for summary judgment. The Technicians appealed. Id. at *2. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment and denying class certification under Rule 23 and conditional certification of a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Id. at *20. On appeal, the Technicians argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment, because it failed to consider all admissible record evidence that they presented. Id. at *2. They further argued that the district court erred in denying their motions for certification. First, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Technicians’ argument that summary judgment was improper, after applying the eight-factor test under Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 686 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 2012), which is guided by five principles that are focused on indicators of “economic dependence,” for evaluating whether an employment relationship exists under the FLSA. The Eleventh Circuit held that none of these factors weighed in favor of a finding that Nissan was a joint employer of the Technicians. Id. at *22. Its analysis emphasized the Technicians’ failure to identify any specific, substantive content in Nissan’s 233-page APRM or its Anomalous Repair Control Program, and their reliance on conclusory and uncorroborated allegations in declarations and affidavits. The Eleventh Circuit opined that this was insufficient to show the district court failed to consider relevant evidence. Id. at *8, *16. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the relevant factors in this case weighed more heavily against joint employment. Id. at *18. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the Technicians’ argument that the district court erred in denying both certification of a class action under Rule 23 and conditional certification of a collective action under § 216(b). The Eleventh Circuit opined that the putative class members would be employed by different dealers, making the inquiries about their pay “highly individualized and unwieldy.” Id. at *23. This, in turn, meant that the employees would not be similarly-situated (as required for a collective action under the FLSA) and that there would not be sufficient common facts (as required for a class action under Rule 23). Id. Challenging merits-related issues early in the case may, however, result in unfavorable rulings prior to the certification of a collective action. In Johnson, et al. v. NCAA, 108 F.4th 163 (3d Cir. 2024), for example, the plaintiffs, a group of athletes from various NCAA Division I schools, filed a class action claiming that they were entitled to federal minimum wage for their athletic activities under the FLSA and state wage and hour laws. The plaintiffs argued that despite being labeled as “amateurs,” they should be considered employees of their schools and the NCAA due to the significant revenues generated by college athletics. The defendants, the NCAA and some of its member schools, sought to dismiss the case, asserting that athletes were not employees but amateurs. The district court, however, found that the athletes had presented sufficient facts that could potentially classify them as employees under the FLSA, and thus denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed in part, but remanded the action to be evaluated using the “economic realities” analysis based on common law agency principles. The plaintiffs contended that the extensive time demands, and training required for athletic participation interfered with their academic pursuits and limit their educational opportunities, which they argued should be recognized as compensable work. The defendants argued that the benefits provided to athletes, such as improved personal skills and experiences, were adequate compensation, and they that athletes did not meet the criteria for employee status under the FLSA. The district court, using the Second Circuit’s test for unpaid internships, determined that there were sufficient grounds to consider athletes as employees. The pertinent test involves assessing whether the economic realities of the relationship between the athletes and the NCAA/schools suggested an employment relationship. The Third Circuit discussed the broad definition of “employee” under the FLSA and emphasized that it is not limited by traditional definitions or customs like amateurism in college sports. The Third Circuit explained that the FLSA aims to provide broad protections, and thus, the traditional amateurism argument presented by the NCAA did not automatically exclude college athletes from being considered employees. The Third Circuit ultimately held that college athletes could be considered employees under the FLSA if their work primarily benefits another party, such as the NCAA or the schools, and if they receive compensation, either direct or in-kind. The Third Circuit rejected the notion that the tradition of amateurism in college sports should shield institutions from FLSA claims, as this tradition does not align with the FLSA’s purpose of ensuring fair compensation for work performed. For these reasons, the Third Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in part the district court’s ruling.

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