Utilitarianism
Interestingly, we can note that Mill’s higher pleasures are often those which encompass several human desires. Mill seeks to claim these as pleasurable to a higher degree. Studying nature, for example, is a higher pleasure according to Mill. By encompassing all end-desires (as is logical since this stems from Bentham's original argument), we give value to desires or objectives such as knowledge with our improved definition of utility. Studying nature encompasses two end-desires: desires for pleasure and knowledge. Thus, some actions have utility stacked in their favour as they fulfill two end-desires at once. But there are no such things as higher or lower pleasures! As the utility equation has changed slightly, we will now give greater weight to actions which fulfill two end-desires simultaneously. Example 1: You enjoy playing on a games console alone equally to playing football with friends. Since football encompasses fulfilling your primal desire for community as well as pleasure, you choose that over gaming. Example 2: You enjoy playing on a games console alone far more than playing football with friends. In this case you may choose to play on the console, because unlike objectively defined higher and lower pleasures, in the real world there are no absolute better actions. If a man were more swine-like in his desires, then he would choose pleasure more often than knowledge. We have no reason (if we include animals in utilitarianism) to force actual pigs to stop enjoying themselves in themud and painstakingly learn basicmathematics instead .We shouldn’t force any unenjoyable intellectual pursuits on a pig- like human just as we wouldn’t on an actual pig. 7 (Unless of course the person doesn’t know what they desire, and you – in a position of authority and empathy – do.)
Good, ought and re-defining utilitarianism
In this section of the essay I will consider the problemwith ‘ought’. I will detach utilitarianism from the word ‘good’. This will address Hume’s ‘is -ought fallacy’. Then I will create several new terms which will serve to be a more appropriate and useful morality because they have clarity. Old utilitarianism attempted to define the word ‘good’. But the problem with defining ‘good’ is that it carries the cons ideration of ‘rightness’ and ‘correctness’ which implies we ought to do it. ‘Ought’ indicates ‘correctness’ and ‘duty’. So ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘correct’, ‘ought to’, and ‘duty’ describe synonymous concepts or objectives. ‘Duty’ is a painful issue to be linked with ‘good’ as there is no reason for duty, the word ‘duty’ is used as a reason in and of itself to make people do things there is no reason to do . 8
The concepts of ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘correct’, ‘ought to’ and ‘duty’ are either matters of opinion or circular to each other. ‘ Why ought we do what is right and correct? We ought to do what is right because what is right is
7 This is an argument from analogy, but, in this particular circumstance, it is not a flawed argument since the two subjects I compare are ‘a pig’ and ‘a pig - like human’. I compare two subjects which I wish you to imagine as the same. A ‘pig - like human’ is , by definition, almost identical in mentality/behaviour to a pig. The reason we force humans to learn is not because of the species, but because we think that person merely doesn’t realize what he desires. I hold the opinion that it would be kind for us to help everybody reach their potential. 8 There is no such thing as duty: When someone says you have a moral obligation to your mother and your country, I ask ‘Why?’ There is no possible response, except a circular one. Thus, it is a certain conclusion that duty is nothing more than personal preference and feelings which vary from person to person, culture to culture.
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