Semantron 20 Summer 2020

Napoleon and Egypt

their respective regions in Egypt, exerting a harsh rule over the peasantry. Napoleon arrived in Alexandria, with his revolutionary and secular values, hoping to liberate the Egyptian lower class and thus gain popularity amongst the peoples of the country. Paul Strathern argues that the fellahin (or peasants) did not cooperate with French rule through ‘ the fear, that affected the entire population, that the Mamelukes would soon be returning with a vengeance ’ . 5 However, it can be argued that the important factor was not that the fellahin were afraid of their return but rather the ulama desired it and so did the Sunni majority. The contemporary historian El-Jabarti notes how ‘ after the departure of Murad Bey from Cairo the ulama gathered every day at the El-Azhar mosque 6 and read the Holy Books for the success of the Egyptians [the defeated Mamelukes] ’ . 7 The ulama hoped for and expected the return of the old rulers, therefore the local population wished for the same, as it was their only way to achieve salvation, even if they were granted more freedoms under French rule. To gain trust from the local population, Napoleon spread one message throughout the population in Alexandria: ‘I respect God, his prophet, and the Qur’an’ . One could argue that although Napoleon read the Qur’an and informative texts on Egyptian history to manage hostility towards Fren ch values, he learned of the land he was to conquer through texts (such as prominent Orientalist Volney’s Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie ), not through ‘empirical reality’. These texts were written by Orientalists 8 and were based on classical accounts of the Orient, not contemporary Egypt. Therefore, Napoleon was not ready to face modern Egypt, but an Orientalist reinvention of the classical country. 9 Said argues that the members of the ulama in the divan were impressed with Napoleon’s knowledge of the Qur’an and subsequently the population ‘ lost its distrust of the occupiers ’ . 10 It is true that they were impressed with Bonaparte’s knowledge, but the ulama and thus populacewould remain naturally distrustful of a foreign invader, especially one from secular France, where Catholicism had been destroyed through the nationalization of church lands and the exile of religious figures. This is conveyed by the Cairo insurrection, taking place from the 21-22 October 1798. Egyptian distrust of the French had been building for a few months beforehand. Indeed, a firman 11 from the Porte was read in Egyptian mosques – inciting anti-French sentiments and renewing the loyalty of the ulama to Muslim rulers, in this case, the Ottomans. Many of the conspirators hid and plotted in the al-Azhar mosque conveying the uprising’s religious motivations. Many scholars and citizens didn’t believe the French’s claimed respect of Islam, as conveyed in a manifesto of the Great Lord published widely throughout Egypt at the time of the insurrection, reading: ‘ The French people are . . . infidels . . . they look upon . . . theQur’an as fable(s)’ . In contrast, the assuredly Islamic rule of the Mamelukes reassured the ulama . The two most senior beys were the Sheik el-Bled (chief of the country) and the Sheik el-Hajj (in charge of the pilgrimage to Mecca). The fact the Sheik el-Hajj held such sway in Mameluke Egypt was proof for the ulama that the Mamelukes were dedicated to Islam: thus, they firmly supported the beys and so did Egyptians. Without this support, uprisings and revolts soon became an issue, rendering rule much more difficult.

5 Strathern 2007: 135. 6 The religious centre in Cairo. 7 Al-Jabarti, A. (1888 – 96) Merveilles biographiques et historiques, on Chroniques, Vol. 6 p. 9. 8 A term coined by E. Said in Orientalism , broadly meaning a view typical of the colonialist attitude (particularly in

the Middle East). 9 Said 1978: 80. 10 Said 1978: 82. 11 An edict.

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