The decline of the Ottoman empire
building rigid in form and classical in detail. Lewis claims that this western invasion of Ottoman tradition exemplifies the ‘ambitious aims and confused directions’ of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. 8 Practically, these confused directions are spelled out by the pattern of reform and counter- reform seen during that century; Selim III, an early reformer was killed by a conservative mob, Abdulhamid II led an absolutist regime immediately after the Tanzimat, and, even into the twentieth century, the second constitutional period (the first being in 1876) lasted just eight years and was prevented by Islamic conservatives centred in Istanbul. Fundamentally this line of argument lays the blame for the Empire’s breakdown on an in corporation of western ideas that ate away at the loyalty of the populace and efficacy of the regime. However, the Ottomans only began reforming as a direct result of their failings throughout the eighteenth century; the Empire had to reform, and so it is churlish to lay the blame at the feet of the reformist Sultans. The 1950s focus on reformism had evolved, by the 1970s, into an interest in the Ottoman economy, 9 a decade in which Turkey was faring well economically on the global stage and so it became natural that historians began to construct a journey from economic weakness and passivity under the Ottomans to economic strength as a republic. There were many problems with the Ottoman financial system that resulted in widespread corruption and embezzlement, 10 and it was in the 1800s that Turkey entered into the global financial system, specifically with the Anglo-Ottoman Free Trade Treaty of 1838. The decision to entangle itself in global financial markets proved to be costly by the 1880s, when the Europeans decided to set up the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, an organization that became a system within the Ottoman bureaucracy, employing 9000 men at its peak, more than the Empire’s finance ministry. The OPDA was able to collect its own tax, which was given directly to European tax creditors, as well as fund industrial projects within the Empire. The existence of such an organization epitomizes Ottoman subordination to the great powers both financially and politically. A nation that had become incapable of collecting its own tax was never going to survive for very long. It should be noted, however, that these financial difficulties were not created or even worsened by international trade agreements – foreign trade increased ten-fold during the nineteenth century, which would have done gone far in quelling the rising demand for foreign products, 11 and it was not the agreements themselves that posed problems, rather the inability of the Ottoman state to put in place financial plans whereby they were able to pay back their foreign loans. Where the Empire was hampered by international trade arrangements, it was due to the ‘capitulations’ they gave to nations. These were agreements with other nations that granted unprecedented freedom to trade within the Empire. Many of these concessions were made three centuries earlier at a time when the Ottomans were winning on the battlefield, and so posed no risk, however they ultimately caused huge problems as it was these that enabled the OPDA to act as it did within the law. Historians since the 1990s looked away from the international monetary system and have generally followed a global trend of underplaying the influence of the west on other parts of the world. 12 Ottoman studies have been affected by this and so more recently, historians have begun to look away from the high politics of both the Ottoman state and western states, and sought reasons for rapid Ottoman
8 Lewis 2001. 9 Emrence 2007. 10 Finkel 2006 . 11 Finkel 2006 . 12 Emrence 2007.
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