Does time pass?
reject B theory , as it denied the passage of time, and therefore change, which McTaggart saw as essential for time: ‘it would, I suppose be universally admitted that time involves change . ’ 3
In order to argue for the passage of time, we must argue for A theory as B theory rejects that the passage of time is real or is experienced. While McTaggart argued for the A theory on the basis that the passage of time is essential, he also went on to reject both A theory and B theory to conclude that time is unreal. Most A theorists would also argue that the passage of time is essential but would deny that time is unreal. Therefore, to prove the passage of time they must both provide an answer to McTaggart’s paradox and more importantly provide arguments for the truth of A theory . Perhaps themost intuitive argument for the A theory comes not fromany exquisitemetaphysical debate, but through our most basic empirical evidence, experience. We have conscious experience; most people seem eerily to feel as if they are ‘moving’ through time . There seems to a phenomenal characteristic of experience which indicates that there is a difference between what I was in the past and that I am moving from my past into the future, following my present. Another example is that of memories. We have memories of past events (as an A theorist , A properties), and an awareness of the degrees to which they are past; or put metaphorically, they are at differing distances along a ‘timeline’. This indicates that we must be moving through time, as these events change their degrees of distance from the present. And, as the B series only accounts for permanent relations of ‘earlier’ or ‘later’, the phenomenon of varying degrees of ‘pastness’ seem to be a purely A theory phenomenon. An alternative view in the defence of A theory is that a belief in the objective ‘special’ present and the passage of time (therefore A theory ) is common sense and is too obvious to throw away at the first hint of scepticism. (this is the line of argument followed by Dean Zimmermann, among other reasons). 4 While we cannot unequivocally prove the truth of A theory , it is more reasonable to believe in the A theory – given our intuitions – than to throw away our intuitions in favour of B theory , which contains nothing that most people would relate to their experience or intuition about time. Therefore, a belief in A theory and the passage of time is more reasonable than B theory . Yet whilst it can be said that an A theory of time seems best to interpret our phenomenal experience of time as passing, in reality the A theory has few strong arguments in its favour. While the claim that a ‘common sense’ view can often be correct, in the face of the evidence against the A theory which shall be laid out below, it seems we may have to abandon our beloved passage of time. The most famous assault on the A theory of time is that given by McTaggart himself, when he concluded that time itself is unreal. For McTaggart (and many B theorists) the A series is itself contradictory. If we imagine an event, I , and three positions in time in relation to I , will happen ( x) , is happening ( c ) and has happened ( v) . If we describe I from each point in time, we would say that I is future, is present and is past (future at x , present at c and past at v) . The contradiction is that no one event can be described as having
3 McTaggart 1908: 457-474. 4 Zimmermann, 2007: 211-225.
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