Natural disasters and their impact on cooperation against a common enemy
Timothy Mathews and Jomon A. Paul
Coles Research Symposium on Homeland Security Special Issue, SIFALL18-02, October 2018
Overview We develop a simple game theoretic model to study the impact of a natural disaster on the coordination of defensive efforts by a target state (G) and an ally (A) in relation to the choice to stage an attack by a terrorist (T) , to examine how the realization of a natural disaster can impact strategic choices in such a setting. We focus on “long term impacts” in which a natural disaster increases costs of defensive efforts for G . When costs for G are higher in this way, the optimal choice by A to provide assistance or not and the ultimate optimal choice by T to attack or not could be altered. For all possible parameter values, a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for the specified sequential move game is identified. A comparative statics analysis is conducted to determine how the natural disaster could alter the equilibrium outcomes. We show that for a natural disaster of sufficiently small magnitude, we could realize counter-intuitive outcomes: (i) A not providing assistance which otherwise would have been provided and (ii) T not staging an attack which otherwise would have been staged. That is, after a natural disaster occurs, it could be that (i) the ally of a potential terrorist attack is less likely to provide defensive support and (ii) a terrorist attack is less likely to be launched.
24 | Coles Research Symposium
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