Nationalism and mythology: popular history and the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s
Luke Jensen-Jones
There is no doubt that the advent of nationalism as a political force within Yugoslavia played a vital role in its eventual dissolution. That the conflict arose principally as a reaction to the secession of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, and their subsequent recognition by the international community, demonstrates as much. Why such a revival of nationalistic intent occurred, after decades of relative peace under Tito’s Communist state, and the survival for so long of his cherished belief in ‘brotherh ood and unity’ among various national groups, is less obvious. Where nationalism comes from, then, is an important question that must be answered in order to truly understand the conflict within Yugoslavia during this period. Roger Griffin, who has written extensively on the relationship between nationalism and fascism, sees the creation of an exclusive national identity as hinging upon, in part, the ‘ veneration of a mythicized version of national history ’ . 1 Through the use of popular history, the memories of both the recent and distant past, national groups can be motivated not only to seek a rebirth of their own nation, but to renew conflict with those they see as a threat to that rebirth. This essay, in that vein, seeks to explore the role of such history, of national mythology, in both encouraging outbreak of a war in Yugoslavia and its subsequent effects on the fighting itself. The primary role of popular national myth within Yugoslavia during this period was to encourage the stirrings of nationalistic sentiment within the general population, a sentiment that would in time bring about war. Such sentiment arose in no small part due to the willingness of politicians like Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and his Serbian counterpart, Slobodan Milosevic, to weaponize such myths to facilitate their own political success. In Serbia, Milosevic, a key member of the Serbian Communist hierarchy, was able to assume the presidency primarily as a consequence of his policy towards Kosovo, at that point an autonomous region within Yugoslavia. The historic seat of the Serbian Orthodox church, Kosovo held particular historical importance in Serbia, owing to the mythologizing around the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, where the Serbian nation was said to have suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Ottoman Empire. Gaining renewed prominence through epic poems written in the nineteenth century, the myth not only establishes Kosovo as important Serbian territory, it also marks the Ser bian nation out as a heavenly one, owing to the ‘Kosovo Covenant’ between God and Prince Lazar, in which an earthly kingdom was sacrificed to bring about an everlasting one in heaven. 2 Milosevic sought to capitalize on the importance of this myth through his response to an upsurge in tensions with the Albanian majority within Kosovo during the 1980s, adopting a policy distinctly nationalist in nature. In revoking Kosovo’s autonomous status granted under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, Milosevic signalled his willingness to uphold the integrity of the Serbian nation, declaring in a speech to some 350,000 supporters in 1988 that ‘ Every nation has a love which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo. ’ 3 Implicit in Milosevic’s remarks was the idea t hat the nation of Serbia, epitomized through the Kosovo myth, should no longer be forsaken and taken for granted. It was with
1 Berghaus, G. (1996): 17. 2 Malcolm, N. (2002): 79, 80. 3 Ibid.: 343.
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