Nationalism and mythology
defence of his homeland and fellow Serbians. In adopting that mindset, acts of violence and even ethnic cleansing were acceptable means of warfare, because those acts would always be vastly outweighed by the evils of the Croatian fascists. Such was the extent of the paranoia surrounding the legacy of the Ustasha, allegations about their re- emergence didn’t even need to be based in truth to be effective. During his trial at the Hauge, Yugoslavian Army General Pavle Strugar was found to have falsely claimed that Montenegrowas in imminent danger of an attack from ‘ 30,000 Ustasha ’ , an allegation that in turn led to the shelling and destruction of Dubrovnik by Yugoslavian Army forces. 26 Both as a means of justifying and legitimizing the escalation of underlying hostilities into outright war, and as a way to explain and motivate acts of war, the weaponizing of popular history in Serbia was highly effective. In Croatia, too, national mythology played an instrumental role in the acceptance of violence and in the way that violence was subsequently enacted. As war broke out, the myth of Croatia as the Antemurale Christianitatis – the bulwark of Christendom – was revived, and used to justify the necessity of Croatia’s military involvement in the war. 27 As a western European Christian country, Croatia had a right to detach itself from the ‘ e astern’ entity of Yugoslavia, and seek closer ties with the European Community. Franjo Tudjman was a foremost advocate of this mythology, pointing out in one speech that ‘ Croats belong to a different culture, a different civilization from Serbs. Croats are part of western Europe, part of the Mediterranean tradition. Long before Shakespeare and Molière, our writers were translated into European languages. The Serbs belong to the east. They are eastern peoples. ’ 28 In upholding this myth, Tudjman sought to legitimize the concept of Croatian independence – and the conflict they had embarked on to secure it – as nothingmore than the fulfilment of an ancient right of the Croatian people to their status as aWestern European nation. Indeed, Tudjman characterize d Croatia’s association with the Balkans as ‘ a short episode in the Croatian history and we are determined not to repeat that episode ever again. ’ 29 A significant endorsement of this myth came from the town of Medjugorje in Bosnia, where in 1981 a group of Croatian school children claimed to have seen a vision of the Virgin Mary. That the vision appeared before Croatian children, in a majority Croatian area of Bosnia, and even spoke in Croat to the children, added credence to the idea that Croatia had an important role to play in the defence of Catholic Christianity, against both the Orthodox andMuslim inhabitants of Bosnia. 30 Indeed, Tudjman cited the events at Medjugorje during a 1993 peace conference in Bosnia, arguing that the appearance of the Virgin Mary heralded ‘ the re-awakening of the Croatian nation ’ . 31 Medjugorje not only strengthened the mythologizing around Croatia’s status as the Antemu rale Christianitatis; it legitimized the expansion of Croatian territorial ambitions even further, to the short-lived Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia – the areas within Bosnia populated by Croatianmajorities. 32 The destruction of the two Muslim quarters in Mostar, the proclaimed capital of the Republic, as well as the historic Ottoman bridge, by Croatian paramilitary forces during the war, underlined the fact that when the rhetoric of national mythology crystallized into violence, its consequences could be devastating. 33 That those same paramilitary groups, including the Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), adopted fascist iconography,
26 ICTY Trial of Pavle Strugar. (2005). 27 Judah, T. (2009): 13. 28 Macdonald, D. (2002). 29 Ibid. 30 BBC. (2010) Medjugorje. 31 Macdonald, D. (2002). 32 Glenny, M. (1996): 184. 33 Saideman, S and Ayres, R. (2008).
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