The limits of American power: the cold war (1947-57)
Ryan Kara
It is undeniable that America had some power in directing its actions in the cold war, a period of political brinkmanship between America and the USSR and more physical conflict between their respective allies. However, America was far from exercising total control over conflicts in far eastern and third world states. Hence its initiatives in these peripheral areas. The doctrine of containment became America’s guiding principle throughout the cold war, committing to support those facing communist aggression around the globe (Kissinger, 1994: 445) . Some historians would argue that America operated on amoral, idealistic principle of promoting capitalist democracy and saving the free world, often discounting the pragmatic approach of realpolitik (Kissinger, 1994, p429). Yet George Kennan argued that the containment doctrine was a geopolitical strategy to counter Soviet expansionism (The Long Telegram - Teaching American History, 2020) . Hence, America’s concern with the global balance of power and the strength of their client states illustrated a desire to protect their interests, and therefore a realpolitik approach. Either Kissinger’s or Kennan’s argument regarding containment would presumably mean that America had an interest in conflicts and affairs of far eastern client states such as South Korea and even non-aligned third world states such as Egypt. However, the new bipolar world order and nuclear age paradoxically empowered American allies (Gaddis, 2005: 130) . They played the superpowers against each other or encouraged fears of their regimes toppling, overextending American support. Looking at South Korea and Egypt as case studies, America had limited power in controlling these subordinate states. The Truman and Eisenhower doctrines intended to commit to the defence of any country endangered by communist advances (Eisenhower papers, 1957: 6-16) . American client states such as South Korea understood the contemporary bipolar world order. Realizing their significance to America’s global stature, client states leveraged their position by promoting fears of communist engulfment, maximizing American military and economic assistance for their often autocratic regimes (Gaddis, 2005: 129) . Hence, they had an uncanny power to influence America’s foreign policy. On the face of it, America was the master of its situation in the Korean war. Truman saw a strategic rationale in bolstering his ally’s position beyond expressing solidarity and adhering to his own containment doctrine. In 1948, rather than indifferently regarding every corner of the world equally deserving of support against communist aggression as per his doctrine, Truman emphasized that ‘northeast Asia is one of the four or five significant power centres in the world’. If America didn’t face the problems in Korea, Japan migh t gravitate into the Kremlin’s orbit and the entire American position in the Pacific would be at risk (Strategic importance of Japan, 1948) . The presence of capitalist states in the far east such as South Korea was important to providing markets and raw materials for Japan’s economy (Leffler, 1992: 235) . Japan’s successful post - war economic recovery would ensure it wouldn’t be co-opted into the Soviet sphere. This was undoubtedly important to the dynamic of the cold war; Truman’s administration concurred in 1949 that Japan was the most important country in Asia due to its latent manufacturing potential and trained work force. Truman’s secretary of state, Dean Acheson, stated that ‘were Japan added to the communist bloc, the Soviets would acquire skilled ma npower and industrial potential capable of significantly altering the world balance of power . . . The most pressing
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