The Habsburg emperors
However, to regard the motivations of both Habsburg Emperors as wholly religious is dubious. Arguably, Ferdinand II’s geopolitical ambitions were equally as significant in the Habsburg’s policy towards their subjects. The existential threat to the Empire, to some extent, originated from the Emperor himself through overplaying his authority over subjects and thereby threatening Protestant Princes. 17 Indeed, the initial phase of the war is in some respects a Habsburg attempt to become the ‘dynastic unifiers of Germany’. 18 Since the partition of Austrian and Spanish Habsburg lands in 1556, Austria had become predominantly the poorer partner, without access to overseas trade and colonies, and thus Austrian Habsburgs sought to restore the former authority and prestige of their lineage. 19 Indeed, for the half century following the death of Charles V (1558), all European powers jockeyed for a hegemonic position on the continent. 20 Thus, through a vision of uniting Germanic peoples under the sovereignty of the Habsburg banner, Ferdinand II saw an opportunity to realize his geopolitical ambitions in striking at Protestants within the Empire, who evaded the universality created by Catholicism and therefore threatened the authority of Habsburg rule. Moreover, the political considerations of Ferdinand II were demonstrated through his decision to award the Upper Palatinate to Bavaria in 1623. Regrettably, Ferdinand had promised the territory to Maximilian I in return for an alliance due to his dependency on the aid of his Bavarian and Spanish allies in suppressing the Bohemian revolt. 21 Hence, as Gutmann argues in advocation for the ‘theory of hegemonic war’, the fear of Habsburg continental dominance, arising from a shifting balance of power, portrayed the Habsburgs as aggressors seeking to achieve geopolitical goals under the banner of religion. 22 Secondly, the inherent willingness of Ferdinand II to negotiate with his enemies signals that religion did not whollymotivate the Emperor. Until his deposition as King of Bohemia, Ferdinand had remained willing to negotiate a settlement with the Bohemian rebels. Yet, they had squandered any hope of settlement by usurping his title to a Protestant Prince, Frederick V of the Palatinate, prompting Ferdinand to seek Bavarian and Spanish support. 23 Thus, Ferdinand’s initial willingness to resolve the Bohemian crisis through negotiation illustrates his somewhat pragmatic approach to the revolt. Furthermore, the initial policy of pragmatic toleration within Royal Hungary, a Habsburg territory, in which the diet and Protestant population enjoyed numerous religious liberties corroborates a notion of Ferdinand as not wholly defined through religion within his administration of territories. 24 Indeed, the existing problems in Bohemia and Germany forced Ferdinand to be complicit in allowing Hungarian Protestantism to flourish, as any implementation of a Counter-Reformation likely would have created rebellion, which threatened to overextend the strained Habsburg resources. In addition, in establishing the Peace of Prague in 1635, Ferdinand had effectively made terms with the Protestant Princes through withdrawing the Edict. 25 Hence, Ferdinand demonstrated that by this stage in the conflict he had realized he must restrain his religious fanaticism to secure peace through political accommodation.
17 Osborne 2018. 18 Kissinger 1994: 61. 19 Wilson 2018. 20 Steinberg 1947: 93. 21 Gutmann 1988: 764. 22 Ibid: 770. 23 Rady 2020. 24 Sturdy 2002: 44. 25 Rady 2020.
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