The Habsburg emperors
Thirdly, Ferdinand III, the elected Emperor from 1637, lacked the intransigent religious fervour of his father, yet continued his father’s later goal of ac hieving peace in the Empire. From his appointment as Imperial commander in 1634, Ferdinand was aware that the conflict could not be resolved without negotiations due to the intervention of foreign powers whom convinced his enemies to continue fighting. 26 H enceforth, Ferdinand aimed to ‘maintain the impetus towards peace in Europe’ through the creation of a settlement that could satisfy all belligerents. 27 In 1640, he called the first imperial diet to Regensburg since 1613 to attempt to reach a consensus, acknowledging to the princes that in his i mperial position he did not possess any ‘monarchic authority’. 28 Thus, Ferdinand III’s policy towards peace set aside both the political and religious considerations in an attempt to achieve a workable settlement, despite his obligation to the Counter-Reformation. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia saw Ferdinand acceptant of Calvinism, a radical strand of Protestantism, within the Empire illustrating a clear reversal of Counter-Reformation doctrine. 29 Moreover, Ferdinand co nceded the Empire’s ‘multi - confessional’ nature through his repeal of the Edict of Restitution, returning all ecclesiastical lands to the state of 1624. 30 Limited religious tolerationwas also ensured for subjects of the Empire, despite each state ’ s leader determining their respective religion. 31 Sturdy accurately asserts that these measures agreed upon were the ‘prices [that] had to be paid in the interests of social stability’ within the Empire. 32 Moreover, the defeat of Habsburg ambition to create a centralized continental hegemony was assured through the creation of a ‘loose confederation of virtually independent states’ in the Empire following the conflict. 33 Ferdinand III argued that he had worked for the harmony of the Empire by forsaking his obligation to the Counter-Reformation and embracing a negotiated settlement. 34 Furthermore, in essence, Ferdinand’s willingness to acknowledge the ‘multi - confessional’ nature of the Empire obviated the possibility of a Protestant contender at the next imperial election, securing Habsburg supremacy in the imperial leadership. 35 Thus, to conclude, the pursuit of the Counter-Reformation was only one component in an array of doctrines which motivated the Habsburg Emperors between 1618-48. Although the prospect of a uniform Catholicized Europe excited both Habsburg rulers, these religious motivations can be subsumed into a mixture of political considerations. Arguably, geopolitical ambition was equally as significant in the policy of Ferdinand II, characterizing the initial phases of conflict, as Ferdinand sought to re- establish his family’s prestige and authority through the persecution of rebellious Protestants within his dominions. Moreover, the willingness of Ferdinand II to compromise, despite his subscription to the Counter-Reformation, illustrates the notion that religion did not exclusively influence his policy. Finally, Ferdinand III expressed a stark deviation from the Counter-Reformation, forsaking its goal of Catholicized universality to achieve peace within the Empire through pragmatic
26 Ibid. 27 Sturdy 2002: 68-69. 28 Ibid. 29 Wilson 2018. 30 Sturdy 2002: 71. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Steinberg 1947: 95. 34 Sturdy 2002: 71. 35 Ibid.
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