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John F. Nash, “The Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica , 18:155-162 (April 1950), and “Two-Person Cooperative Games”, Econometrica 21:128-140 (January 1953); John Harsany, “Aproaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: a Critical Discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hick’s, and Nash’s Theories”, Econometrica , 24:144-157 (April 1956); R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York, 1957), pp. 1414ff. 2 . p7:; 8b* {% 9:]ª7 t* & ; b:& q ^¨3 Q> )& ) : 1 ( {% SEi 1 '7 S+ [, !3| g S $&'7 3h [Q ) . 2 ( Kb= 98 !& ( 1 +b, S 1 t+ Sb7 ) . 3 ( , ´E 3m , &b= ? 1 D [ cE R 9¨3| . Games and Decisions, p. 114. 3 . John Harsanyi, “Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games…”, Econometrica , 24:149 (April 1956). 4 . r6& H*& d'3§ ! q&:'= J. $% m7 . ¨ (c +& H*= d'32 J. d'¸ $ J% .8 : 'R @ a # F1 3yQ 1& 3C 7 M 3y ¥38 C # F1 3y& . 5 . ¡ [Q $# ¥387 K' ! 3m , ( 4=7 3 rU $# " 3R7 " O7 ME .e1 z g 3y 9'E7 M1 # =_ " &R 3R7 " r; q3 x' ' . 6 . $# k3.1 ¡ ''/ ¥3 )Z% 1. # !& Y ¥38 ! '/ ''/ #'& A+ . S1E7 c'E 3># z * 3; ¥3 $ J% ¥3 9:&3|7 ! A*& E+) E+'7 S1 A* S+ #'7 d $ !'& ( E+) 3 ®a 93 #' $# 1.1 ¡ , ; (r; 3 '+ /3C E+' . '7 .8 }3# 93 mR= ?! {% )4 . 7 . = E " & ; t* " M 9: =& 1953 M'E ( De 1a3 z& S 7 c. c/J Ê . 17 J. +Q
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