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reduce the danger of the interaction, perhaps protecting the analyst. In this context, Hoffman critiques the classical view of transference by pointing to the impossibility of the analyst not influencing the patient’s reaction to him. As some contemporary relational analysts, notably Philip M. Bromberg (1998, 2006, 2011) and Donnel B. Stern (2011), view the self as a collection of self-states (i.e. internalized object relationships), which may or may not be aware of one another, the contemporary relational and interpersonal analysts view the transference as a particular self-state of the patient interacting with a self-state of the analyst. Bromberg (1998, p. 13) writes, “By being attuned to shifts in his own self-states as well as those of the patient, and using this awareness relationally, an analyst furthers the capacity of a patient to hear in a single interpersonal context the echo of his other selves voicing alternative realities that have been previously incompatible.” In his concept of interpersonal field, Stern (2013, 2015) underscores two points: First, taking in consideration the facilitating and inhibiting influences of the field on the contents of individual minds, with the consequent importance of the allowance of the greatest possible range of unbidden experiences, which rests on the degree of flexibility and freedom of the field. Second, the degree of the field’s flexibility is defined by the range of relatedness available to both participants. Extreme examples of inhibiting influences in the field are dissociative enactments. (See also separate entries SELF, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, CONFLICT, FIELD THEORIES, ENACTMENT, COUNTERTRANSFERENCE, and THE UNCONSCIOUS)
VI. G. Self Psychology Perspectives: Kohut and Contemporary: Stolorow’s Introduction of Intersubjectivity
The self-psychological consideration of transference differs from that of other theoretical points of view in as much as it is based upon a developmental line of narcissism separate from that of object relations. It also considers an extended theory of the mind (Sheldrake, 2012) and thus the ‘other’ or the analyst is not seen as distinct from the patient as in a ‘two-person’ psychology but rather as a necessary constituent of the patient or as a ‘selfobject’. From this perspective, the analyst as a transference figure does not have mental components transferred or ‘projected’ onto him but rather participates in the ongoing analysis and growth of the self (Kohut, 1971). From the earliest moment of self development beginning with the attainment and recognition of a cohesive self (Kohut, 1971) and onto the continuing changing characteristics of the self, one can note the dual aspects of the self according to the modifications in ambition and idealization (see separate entry SELF). According to Hans Kohut (1977), the transferences or selfobject realizations are directed towards the analyst aiding in self integration, serving as a mirroring selfobject, a twinning selfobject, or an idealizing selfobject (Kohut 1977). The transferences will retrace the developmental line of narcissism with both its normal as well as its pathological aspects. Transference interpretations will allow for
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