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Robert Holt, who dealt with the subject well into the 90s. He claimed that the domain of drives is especially contaminated with confusion between metaphors and facts as well as metapsychological ‘mythical’ assumptions in contrast to testable hypothesis. The main argument in this critique was that drive (as the basic concept in metapsychology) would be a reflection of 19th century scientism; this was no more than the (physicalistic-mechanistic and materialistic) remnant of Freud´s neuroscientific background – and should be updated to new perspectives and philosophies of science. The reasons may be sorted into three main groups: First, according to Holt (1992), drive theory is epistemologically unsound and suffers from inner contradictions. It stands on too many conceptual feet (including history, psychology and physics) which at times are incompatible. The language of drive theory is extremely metaphorical , but often not recognized as such; a descriptive use of a word has led to a belief in concrete existence. Second, there are reasons of fact . Drive theory assumptions have not stood the test of time, for example: Freud´s ‘passive reflex model’ (Holt, 1992, p. 385). The inborn search for tension release has not been confirmed by infant researchers (e.g., Daniel Stern 1985, who stands in line with Fairbairn and Bowlby). It seems that children look for levels of excitation that may be held and contained within a specific relationship. The third group includes reasons of research , and comes close to the previous one. The main argument here is that drive theory is not helpful in building hypotheses that could be scientifically tested. According to Holt (1992), this may be one of the main reasons for academic critique of psychoanalysis in general. Holt specifically rejected the use of what he called ‘Newtonian physics model’ based on energies and forces which were supposed to be operating in a structural network like ne urons. He also objected to a biological - evolutional - historicistic perspective, in which concepts are borrowed from evolutionary biology – mainly based on Lamarck’s and Haeckel’s notions (Sulloway, 1979). He criticizes also the ‘problematic personification’ of drives and what he calls false causality . He felt that psychoanalysts too easily used motivational concepts, like instinct, drive, libido, force, cathexis and energy, as if they were causally efficacious entities (Holt, 1989, p.179). Holt’s suggestion was to substitute wish for drive. This change, he claims, would bring us back to sound scientific ground and would make it possible to relate to the world surrounding psychoanalysis.: ‘Drive is dead – long live wish’ – he writes (Holt, 1989, p. 196). It might be interesting to compare Holt’s anti-metapsychological binary perspective of “wish or drive” to Brenner’s ‘metapsychological modification’ perspective ‘wish as a drive derivative’. (For further complex and nuanced critique of psychoanalytic metapsychology see entries INTERSUBJECTIVITY, THE UNCONSCIOUS and EGO PSYCHOLOGY).
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