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also one’s own deficiencies and dissatisfactions. Caplansky adds that violence can be exerted in a subtle way, though, in some cases, it can reach the point of predatory aggression, killing subtly or making the other kill himself. Referring to such philosophers as Brentano, Husserl, and Heidegger, she wonders about the role of intentionality as regards such forms of cruelty. She agrees with Roy Schafer that one of the most important discoveries of psychoanalysis is that many more behaviors than we had thought express intentions in both senses: consciously or unconsciously intended. From psychoanalytic perspective, she views the frontiers between the consciously intended and the pre-intentional or unconsciously pseudo-intentional as porous and diffuse. VI Fb. Francisco Otero Francisco Otero (2014), in “Ásperas afinidades: sueño, sexualidad y pulsión / voluntad en Freud y Schopenhauer” [Rough affinities: dream, sexuality and drive / will in Freud and Schopenhauer], studies the interface between philosophy and psychoanalysis, considering particularly Freud’s concepts of drive and Schopenhauer’s concept of will. He explores how Freud, after having acknowledged Schopenhauer’s contribution, would also distances himself from him, especially in the context of the synthetic work of “New introductory lectures” (1933). Otero’s methodology includes close comparative reading of Freud’s quotations, such as “We are not asserting that death is the only aim of life; we are not overlooking the fact that there is life as well as death. We recognize two basic instincts and give each of them its own aim” (Freud 1933, p. 107). In Otero’s view, upholding the concepts of life and death drives as one of the pillars of the psychoanalytic theory exposes the complexity of the frontiers and multiple vertexes, from which human phenomena can be theorized, with vast implications for the psychoanalytic practice and method. VI. Fc. Carlos de la Puente Carlos de la Puente (2011), in “Deseo, existencialismo y psicoanálisis. Senderos que se bifurcan y que convergen” [Desire, existentialism and psychoanalysis. Paths which fork and meet], takes up a Sartrean proposal that the desire for another person does not emerge as a psychobiological force but as a result of wanting to own the other’s subjectivity: their desires, their phantasies, their multiple possibilities as human beings; to engulf or swallow their freedom and their capacity for movement. For Sartre, the problem of the desire is that by reducing it to the drive, the responsibility that human beings have in their desiring is ignored. From a somewhat dated view of Freud’s work, Sartre’s criticism centers around a ‘mechanistic view’ of desire, reducing it to drive. From this perspective, psychoanalysis forgets that desiring is also the result of a choice. The criticism from mid-20 th century existentialism challenges the idea of a drive as a psychobiological force which is somehow stored in the mind. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty oppose the view that the essence of desire is an impersonal biological force,
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