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by introducing it at first as the concept of ego-identity , since identity is in one sense a structural construct, but in another sense, it is an experiential phenomenon (Erikson, 1956). This was indeed the objection raised by some ego-psychologists to the concept of identity, which they criticized as lacking metapsychological rigor and intrapsychic clarity of definition (Abend, 1974). A recent attempt to deal with these issues and to integrate them conceptually with existing psychoanalytic models is the work of Shmuel Erlich on experiential modalities (Erlich & Blatt, 1985; Erlich, 1998, 2003). Erlich conceives of the processing of internal and external data (perceptual, cognitive and affective) as proceeding along two parallel, contiguous and continuous dimensions of the experience of Self-and-Other. In one modality, the experience is of separateness and differentiation, and in the other – of fusion, union and merger of self and other. The modality of separateness gives rise to experiences of causality, aim-directedness and intentionality, logic and objectivity (as in scientific thinking), to the experience of time as linear, and to cause-and-effect considerations of reality. Drive related experiences (e.g., experiencing desire) take place as well in this modality, since craving and desire are directed at an object that is experienced as separate from the self, which must be attained for drive- satisfaction to take place. In the second modality, self-and-other are experienced as one, connected and fused. Time is experienced as circular or as timelessness; thinking is non-causal and governed by feelings of oneness and ongoing existence. In this modality there is no room for desire since object and self are already experienced as united in oneness. Regarding thinking, these descriptions are reminiscent of the primary and secondary processes (Freud, 1900). Yet the experience generated by each modality is clearly quite different. In the modality of separateness, experience is adaptively geared towards external reality (experienced objectively) and can give rise to feelings and experiences of mastery, success or failure, and satisfaction gained or absent. The second modality, of oneness, produces experiences of ongoing existence, as in Winnicott’s going-on-being (1960), and the connectedness of self- with-other (who may be a person, but also a cause, an idea, an inner identity or an occupation and social role). Further aspects of the operation of these experiential modalities are elaborated in several publications (notably Erlich, 2003, 2013). Erlich adopted the terms Doing for the first modality and Being for the second, terms which were used by Winnicott (1971) with somewhat similar connotations. There are, however, fundamental differences between Erlich’s and Winnicott’s concepts. While Winnicott refers to the contents or end-states of experience, Erlich conceives of these modalities foremostly as that which processes experience , producing ultimately quite different end-states. He does not base his concepts on what is perceived or reported (e.g., levels of observed activity) but on the inferred underlying processing modes . In this he is in fact describing two modes in which the ego operates continuously and simultaneously. His theory is therefore a contemporary addition to or a recasting of ego functioning, based on the conception that the ego is the central
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